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Introduction
The Republic of Colombia has suffered the struggles of an internal armed 
conflict for more than forty years. Through time, different Colombian governments 
have tried to negotiate peace and begin the process of demobilization with various 
illegal guerrilla and paramilitary groups. The most successful peace process with a 
guerilla group has been the reincorporation into civilian life of the rebel group M19 
in 1990. However, since then little has been achieved in terms of peace. 
Since 1990, various governments have attempted to conduct peace negotia-
tions with other illegal armed groups. The most relevant of such efforts were the 
peace negotiations of 1998 to 2002 between the administration of former Colom-
bian president Andrés Pastrana and the Armed Rebel Forces of Colombia (FARC, 
the biggest guerrilla group). Unfortunately, these negotiations failed and in the me-
anwhile the FARC gained territorial power. In fact, since then both the FARC and 
paramilitary groups increased their numbers. In 2002, the government of former 
president Álvaro Uribe initiated a process of transitional justice. Its principal goal 
was the demobilization of the paramilitary group AUC (Colombian United Self-de-
fense Group) and achieved justice. Little has been done in this regard. Poor results 
have been achieved throughout the prosecutions which have been done until now.
Colombia has introduced into its legislation some provisions regarding war 
crimes as part of its duty to structure the national legislation in accordance with 
the Rome Statute provisions. However, no provisions on crimes against humanity 
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were enacted. The lack of legislation around these types of crimes was a result of 
the decision made by the Colombian Congress back in 2000. It concluded that the 
inclusion of crimes against humanity in the Criminal Code could generate judicial 
insecurity and affect fundamental rights.
Colombia has ratified some of the principal human rights conventions such 
as the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights and the American 
Convention on Human Rights. According to both legal instruments, the state 
parties have the duty to ensure the rights recognized in them. The purpose of this 
thesis is to illustrate the importance of implementing into the Colombian Crimi-
nal Code a chapter on crimes against humanity. This thesis will (1) discuss the 
state of international law regarding the obligation to ensure and respect human 
rights in order to (2) show that Colombia’s current legislation does not comply 
with its international obligations on these matters, and that as a consequence it 
does not have effective mechanisms to handle prosecutions with observance of 
the rights of victims and the principle of legality.
In order to explain the first aforementioned issue, four points will be dis-
cussed. First, The obligations to ensure and respect human rights under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN guidelines on re-
paration and Principles on impunity, and the American Convention on Human 
Rights. The purpose of underlying the development of these obligations based on 
these binding and non-binding norms is to show that the enactment of appropria-
te legislation is part of States’ duty to ensure the exercise of the rights contained 
in the abovementioned international instruments. Secondly, it will be explained 
that the enactment of norms is also seen as a mean of compliance of States to 
make judicial remedies available, which is a step in the fulfillment of the obliga-
tion to ensure human rights. Thirdly, it will be mentioned that the obligation to 
take legislative measures has also been seen as mean of reparation and a guaran-
tee of non-repetition. Fourthly, the States’ duty to avoid the adoption of legisla-
tive measures, such as statutory limitations, tending to ban the prosecution of 
perpetrators of crimes against humanity will be also addressed. The purpose of all 
four points is to show that even though States are allowed to determine the way 
how their domestic legislation can be designed, legislative measures have to be 
circumscribed to the guidelines developed by the States’ international obligations 
under the treaties which they have ratified. 
The second issue will be addressed in the last two chapters. It will be seen 
that a way to assess a civil law State’s compliance –such as Colombia- with its 
duties to ensure and respect human rights is throughout the evaluation of their 
criminal legislation. Any gap may lead to serious problems for the vindication of 
the rights of victims and indictees in a criminal process. In order to explain the im-
portance of this point, chapter II will address the negative incidence that the lack of 
legislation has had on the way how the executive branch understands when a crime 
against humanity has been committed and the judiciary’s limitations to do effective 
prosecutions. The last section of the chapter will explain that the available crimes 
are characterized for being underinclusive of international norms. The consequen-
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ce is that the judiciary’s job becomes ineffective and sometimes exceeds the inter-
national framework on the definition of crimes. Meanwhile, chapter III will focus 
exclusively on the way how the described legislative deficiency has triggered an im-
balanced administration of justice. In order to do this, it will explain how the judi-
ciary has faced the prosecutions of militaries involved in extrajudicial killings, and 
the effects of the contradictory rulings of the Supreme and Constitutional courts in 
relation to the application of statutes of limitations in certain prosecutions.
1 General obligations of the colombian state to take legislati-
ve measures as means of compliance with its duty to ensure 
human rights
This chapter will analyze the obligations of Colombia under article 2 the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights1 (hereinafter “the ICCPR” or “the 
Covenant”), and under articles 1.1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Ri-
ghts (hereinafter “the American Convention”, “the Convention”, or “the ACHR”)2.
1.1 Obligations to Ensure and Respect Human Rights
1.1.1 ICCPR
On the word of article 2 of the ICCPR, States have the obligations to ensure 
and protect human rights.3 Accordingly, paragraph 14 determines the first stage 
of these obligations towards the promotion of human rights with respect to all 
individuals within the territory of the States and who are subject to their juris-
diction.5 Article 2(2) goes further when it specifies that the abovementioned obli-
gations can be achieved at first by implementing legislative measures when they 
do not exist: “Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other mea-
sures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary 
steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of 
the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary 
1 See status of ratification in United Nations Treaty Collection: Status of Treaties: Chapter 
IV: Human Rights: Ratification of the Covenant, at <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en> (Last visited February 3 2011).
2 See status of ratification in Organization of American States: Multilateral Treaties: American 
Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”, <at http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/sigs/b-32.html> (Last visited February 14 2011).
3 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (26 May 2004), General Comment No 31: The Nature of 
the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant [General Comment 31],3.
4 “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opin-
ion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” ICCPR, GA res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN 
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966); 999 UNTS 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967), art.2(1).
5 Oscar Schachter, The obligaTion To implemenT The CovenanT in DomesTiC law, in The in-
TernaTional bill of righTs: The CovenanT on Civil anD poliTiCal righTs, 311, Columbia 
University Press, 1981.
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to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.” Manfred Nowak 
explains that during the discussions to approve the treaty “[a] compromise was 
reached with the understanding that Art. 2(2) of the Human Rights Committee’s 
(hereinafter “the HRComm”) draft version constituted a minimum compromise 
requiring States Parties to implement the Covenant as soon as possible.”6 Para-
graph 3 ends explaining the scope of the States’ obligations regarding remedies 
for the individuals whose rights have been violated.7
The actions that States parties to the Covenant have to take in order to 
comply with their international obligations are explained in paragraphs 2 and 3 
of article 2. The wording of article 2(2) is that States should adopt laws or any 
other measures to comply with their obligations to give effect to the rights recog-
nized in this instrument; however, it is not quite clear whether the incorporation 
of the Covenant in national law is a requirement.8 A good understanding on this 
regard might give clues on how the implementation should be done, and how the 
dispositions of the Covenant can be fully developed. 
Cecilia Medina-Quiroga, who is a former judge of the Inter-American Court 
on Human Rights, gives a good explanation of the ways that States have to com-
ply with their duties to protect human rights. Her analysis is based on the dispo-
sitions of the American Convention on Human Rights. Nevertheless, given the 
similarities between this treaty and the ICCPR, her study would give some light 
to understand how States may fulfill their international obligations under the Co-
venant. She says that States comply with their obligation to protect human rights 
throughout positive actions tending to the assurance that international norms 
are applied within their jurisdictions.9 This goal may be achieved either by direc-
tly incorporating the international norms or by creating norms which reproduce 
the content of the international dispositions.10 She also explains that when inter-
national treaties are in force, in certain jurisdictions it is understood that they 
may derogate national laws.11 However, she also expresses that problems may 
rise when interpretation of national and international norms is left solely to the 
judicial branch, so efficient and adequate legal remedies are deemed necessary.12
6 Manfred Nowak, Article 2: Domestic Implementation and Prohibition of Discrimination, 
in U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, 1993, 31.
7 “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose 
rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstand-
ing that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure 
that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent 
judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided 
for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To en-
sure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.” ICCPR, art. 2(3).
8 osCar sChaChTer, supra note 5, 313.
9 Cecilia medina quiroga, las obligaciones de los estados bajo la convención americana sobre 
derechos humanos, in la corte interamericana de derechos humanos – un cuarto de siglo: 
1979-2004 [thestates’ obligationsunderthe american conventionon human rights, in the 
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Some comments related to article 2(2) of the ICCPR illustrate how incorpo-
ration should be. Nowak refers to the discussions held by some State agents before 
the adoption of the Covenant about whether according to this treaty there is any 
obligation to incorporate it in domestic law. He argues that although there is no 
express obligation to incorporate the Covenant, there is a “tendency to promote the 
direct applicability of the Covenant.”13Ramcharan points out that with respect to 
international human rights treaties, States have the duty to ensure that national 
legislation is in accordance with international human rights laws.14 He also adds 
that State Parties to the ICCPR “are required on ratification to make such changes 
to domestic laws and practices as are necessary to ensure their conformity with the 
Covenant.”15 Joseph, Schultz, and Castan also get to the conclusion that “States 
must change their laws so as to conform to their ICCPR obligations.16
Some other good points regarding to the duty of implementation of the IC-
CPR are found in the commentaries of Schachter. He points out the fact that the 
implementation requirement of article 2 has to be read in accordance to article 
40 of the Covenant.17 The aforementioned disposition establishes in its first pa-
ragraph that “State Parties to the Covenant undertake to submit reports on the 
measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and 
on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights: a) within one year of the 
entry into force of the present Covenant for the States Parties concerned; b) The-
reafter whenever the Committee so requests.” Schachter says that the one-year 
period is an indicator “of the extent of the elasticity” of the requisite to reach any 
results.18 He adds that “[...] the elastic principle [cannot] be stretched to justify a 
period of many years of delay […]”19
The former considerations are reinforced by the fact that during the drafting 
discussions the idea of progressiveness in the national implementation of the cove-
nant was rejected by the understanding of its immediate character.20 The Human 
Rights Committee, which is the Treaty-body monitoring the implementation of the 
Covenant,21 was clear in this respect when it expressed in its General Comment 31 
that “unless Covenant rights are already protected by their domestic laws or practi-
ces, State Parties are required on ratification to make such changes to domestic laws 
and practices as are necessary to ensure their conformity with the Covenant.”22
13 Manfred Nowak, supra note 6, 54.
14 Bertrand G. Ramcharan, The International Responsibility to Protect Human Rights, 39 HK 
L.Y. 366 (2009).
15 Id, 372.
16 Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz & Melissa Castan, The International Covenant On Civil 
And Political Rights, Cases, Materials And Commentary 10 (2Nd Ed. 2004).
17 Oscar Schachter, supra note 5, 324.
18 Id, 324.
19 Id, 325.
20 See UN Doc. A/2929, chapter V, (7 Jul 1955), Annotations on the Text of the Draft Interna-
tional Covenant on Human Rights, 10, at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/ar-
ticles1920_iccpr/docs/A-2929.pdf> (Last visited February 4 2011).
21 UN Human Rights Committee, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/index.htm> (last 
visited Feb. 24/2010). 
22 General Comment 31, supra note3, 13.
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The Human Rights Committee stated in one of its reports to the General 
Assembly with respect to Mongolia that any proposed legislation and any kind of 
procedure should be based on the Covenant and other international instruments 
on human rights to guarantee that any changes be made in compliance with its 
obligations.23 Analogous reasoning is held by this body in respect to Sweden when 
it says that it should ensure that its legislation “gives full effect to the rights em-
bodied in the Covenant.”24 Pertaining to New Zealand, the Committee expresses 
its concern about the non-inclusion of certain rights guaranteed by the Covenant 
but not by the New Zealand’s Bill of Rights.25 When analyzing the situation of 
Zimbabwe, the Committee observes that the State needed to accommodate its 
international legislation with the provisions of the Covenant and ensure that its 
rights are not superseded by incompatible legislation.26
The current chapter is trying to explore the understanding of how people’s 
rights may be threatened when States do not take the necessary legislative mea-
sures to comply with their duty to ensure human rights. This is why a brief analy-
sis of the importance of implementation according to the ICCPR has been made. 
However, in order to have a better insight on this issue, this thesis now turns to 
study how some UN guidelines and the ACHR address it.
1.1.2 UN Guidelines and the ACHR
The “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Repa-
ration for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Se-
rious Violations of International Humanitarian Law”27 (hereinafter “the UN Gui-
delines”) and the “Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of 
Human Rights through action to combat Impunity”28 (hereinafter “the Principles 
to combat Impunity”) provide broader explanations of what obligations States have. 
These two documents are not considered to be binding; however, their relevance for 
the purposes of the current thesis is given by their clarity about the steps that Sta-
tes should take in order to comply with their duties to ensure human rights. Hence, 
the UN Guidelines include the incorporation or implementation of human rights 
and international humanitarian law norms as part of States’ duties.29 The Updated 
Set of Principles goes beyond the wording of the aforementioned guidelines when 
it remarks the States’ obligation to enact legislation in order “to ensure protection 
of human rights and to safeguard democratic institutions […]”30
23 See UN Doc. A/47/40 (1994), Report of the Human Rights Committee, 602, at <http://www.
bayefsky.com/general/a_47_40_1992.pdf> (Last visited February 4 2011). 
24 SeeUN Doc. A/57/40 Vol. I (2002), Report of the Human Rights Committee, 79(6); also UN Doc. 
A/52/40 Vol. I (1997), Report of the Human Rights Committee, 134.
25 See UN Doc. A/57/40 Vol. I (2002), Report of the Human Rights Committee, 81(8).
26 SeeUN Doc. A/53/40 Vol. I (1998), Report of the Human Rights Committee, 213.
27 See A/Res/60/147 (21 March 2006).
28 See E/CN.4//2005/102/Add.1 (8 February 2005).
29 Supra note 27, art 3.
30 “[…] Legislative measures necessary to ensure protection of human rights and to safeguard 
democratic institutions and processes must be enacted […]”, supra note 28, principle 38.
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A more precise definition on how States may comply with their international 
obligations is found in the American Convention of Human Rights. It establishes 
the two States’ general obligations under article 1.1: obligation to respect human 
rights and guarantee their exercise.31 The first obligation requires States to abstain 
from violating the human rights recognized in the American Convention.32 The 
Inter American Court has said that whenever there has been an infringement of 
any of the rights of the Convention, there is a violation of article 1.1.33 As stated by 
the Inter American Court in the Velásquez-Rodríguez case, the second obligation 
demands States to ensure the rights recognized in the Convention to any person 
subject to their jurisdiction.34 On the word of the Court, the duty to guarantee the 
rights of the Convention embodies the existence of norms and an appropriate State 
conduct which guarantees the free exercise of human rights.35
Like in the ICCPR’s interpretation with regard to its implementation in na-
tional jurisdictions, the first obligation that the American Convention puts on Sta-
tes is to make international norms compulsory within their jurisdictions. Although 
the first stage to satisfy the duties to prevent and investigate human rights viola-
tions is found in article 1.1, article 2 states that the adequacy of domestic norms to 
guarantee the rights or freedoms not already ensured is the next step to be taken.36 
Cecilia Medina-Quiroga reflects that States are the ones entitled to decide upon the 
enforcement of international norms within their boundaries37 and that “once an in-
ternational norm has been ratified, the State has to adequate its laws to the first.”38
What has been stated so far is that States fail to comply with their duty 
to ensure human rights when they do not enact legislation in accordance to the 
international legal instruments to which they are parties. Additionally, States 
also fail to stick to their international obligations when they enact norms brea-
31 “The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recog-
nized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of 
those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other 
social condition.” Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, 
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 397, Art. 1. 
32 Cecilia Medina Quiroga, supra note 9, 246-247.
33 Godinez-Cruz v. Honduras, merits, judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No.5, 171 (Jan. 20, 1989).
34 Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.C) No. 4, 166 
(Jul. 29, 1988); Godinez-Cruz v. Honduras, supra note 33, 175.
35 Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, supra note 33, 167 (Jul. 29, 1988); Godinez-Cruz v. Hondu-
ras, supra note 33, 176.
36 “Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already 
ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance 
with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or 
other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.” American Con-
vention on Human Rights, supra note 31, Art. 2.
37 CeCilia meDina Quiroga, supra note 9, 248.
38 Id, 248 (no auThorizeD TranslaTion); See, “The Last Temptation Of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos 
Et Al.) v. Chile, Merits, Reparations And Costs. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 73, 
87 (Feb. 5, 2001) (The Court holds that according to customary international law State-parties 
to a human rights treaty must take the necessary legislative measures (modifications) to ensure 
the compliance with their obligations. Domestic legislation must have effect utile); Hilaire v. 
Trinidad and Tobago, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 80, 
112 (Sep. 1, 2001).
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ching them. Accordingly, the Inter American Court underlies that States may be 
responsible for the violation of human rights as a result of any omissions of the 
legislative branch.39 The Court’s decision in “The Last Temptation of Christ” is 
good example of the responsibility of States derived from the enactment of laws 
contrary to the American Convention. The Court states in this case that Chile 
was internationally responsible because article 19(1) of its constitution allowed 
the censorship of cinematographic films.40 Similar reasoning is found in the Yata-
ma case where the Court expresses that “[t]he general obligation that the State 
should adapt its domestic laws to the provisions of the Convention to guarantee 
the rights it embodies […] includ[ing] the issuance of rules (...)”41 Likewise, the 
tribunal sustains in Cesti-Hurtado that States cannot stop taking the necessary 
legislative measures to give effect to the rights and freedoms in terms of article 
2.42 It also explains that such measures are necessary to ensure the exercise of 
rights and freedoms under article 1.1 of the Convention.43
The former explanations correspond to States’ obligations to respect and 
ensure human rights. Now this thesis turns to the explanation of States’ duties 
when violations of human rights have been committed in consideration to the 
Covenant and the American Convention dispositions.
1.2 Obligations to provide judicial remedies
Implementation of international norms of human rights in domestic juris-
dictions is not the only step necessary to satisfy the obligation to ensure human ri-
ghts. States are also bounded to provide redress when any individual’s rights have 
been harmed according to Article 2(3) of the ICCPR. The Committee has said that 
States comply with what this paragraph states when they determine the judicial 
and administrative mechanisms to repair any violations of the Covenant’s rights.44 
Nowak explains that even sometimes “[t]he mere enactment of a statue or general 
decree, however, may also qualify as an effective remedy.”45 He cites two cases de-
cided by the Committee pertaining to this issue. First, in Installa Costa v Uruguay 
the Committee argued that the implementation of an Act tending to reincorporate 
public servants, whose rights under article 25(c) were breached throughout their 
dismissal based on political, ideological or trade-union grounds during the defac-
39 19 Merchants v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 109, 140 (Jul. 05. 2004); Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Mertis, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No 70, 210 (Nov. 25, 2000); “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et 
al.) v. Chile, supra note 38, 72; “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Mertis, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser C) No. 63, 220 (Nov. 19, 1999).
40 “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos Et Al.) V. Chile, supra note 38, 72.
41 Yatama V. Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations And Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am.Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 127, 170 (Jun. 23, 2005).
42 Cesti-Hurtado v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 56, 166 (Sep. 29, 1999).
43 Id.
44 General Comment 31, supra note 3,¶15.
45 manfreD nowak, supra note 6, 59 
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to government, can be regarded as a remedy.46 Secondly, in Mbenge v Zaire the 
Committee stated that an amnesty law enacted by this State did not provide an 
effective remedy to the unlawful death penalties pronounced before the aforemen-
tioned law.47The Committee has also specified in its General Comment 31 that Sta-
tes comply with what this article establishes when they determine the judicial and 
administrative mechanisms to address any violations.48 With this respect Nowak 
explains that even though administrative and even political remedies are allowed, 
priority is given to the enforcement of the judicial ones.49 The UN Guidelines set 
that victims’ right to remedies include equal and effective access to justice, prompt 
reparation of the harm suffered, and access to significant information relating to 
the violations and reparation.50
1.3 Obligation to legislate as a measure of reparation
When States do not comply with their obligations either by the non-enact-
ment of laws implementing international human rights dispositions or by the 
lacking of judicial remedies, the adoption of legislative measures is considered 
a measure of reparation. The Updated Set of Principles dedicates several of its 
dispositions to this right, but principle 34 determines its scope. It states that 
reparation “shall cover all injuries suffered by victims” and “shall include mea-
sures of restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction as provided by 
international law.”51 Principle 35 includes between the guarantees of non-recur-
rence of violations the “enactment of legislative and other measures necessary 
to ensure respect for human rights and humanitarian law (…)” In this line of 
argumentation, the Committee says that effective remedy is not provided without 
reparation.52 It further explains that reparation may involve “restitution, rehabi-
litation and measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, public memorials, 
guarantees of non –repetition, and changes in relevant laws and practices, as well 
as bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations.”53
As stated by the previous binding and non-binding norms, reparations in-
clude a wide range of measures, which have been considered and amplified by the 
Inter American Court of Human Rights in several of its decisions. A particular 
characteristic of the Inter American Court jurisprudence pertaining to reparations 
is that it expands them beyond just economic measures.54 For instance, the Myrna 
Mack Chang case lists a broad number of reparations that the State of Guatemala 
46 See Stalla Costa v. Uruguay, Communication No. 198/1985, 10 (9 July 1987), <http://www.
bayefsky.com/pdf/148_uruguay198vws.pdf>.
47 See Mbenge v. Zaire, Communication No. 16/1977, 18 (25 March 1983), <http://www.bayefsky.
com/pdf/100_zaire16vws.pdf>.
48 General Comment 31, supra note 3, 15.a
49 Manfred Nowak, supra note 6, 59.
50 Supra note 27, art. 11. Articles 12 - 24 are more specific in the explanation of each type of remedy.
51 See E/CN.4//2005/102/Add.1 (8 February 2005), principle 38.
52 General Comment 31, supra note 3,16.
53 Id,16. [Emphasisadded]
54 Sergio Garcia Ramírez, La Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericanan de Derechos Huma-
nos en Materia de Reparaciones in La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos – Un Cuarto 
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had to comply with.55 So, they included the payment of certain amount of money 
for the concept of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.56 The judgment also in-
cluded other forms of reparation such as the investigation and punishment of the 
responsible, official reproval of the human rights violations, and undertaking of 
measures to avoid the future occurrence of human rights violations.57 Likewise, 
the decision explained the importance of the right to the truth in its individual and 
collective dimension as a relevant mean of reparation.58 The State’s public acknow-
ledgment of its responsibility was also explained as a guarantee of non-recidivism.59
Other types of reparative measures were decided in this case, but the more 
pertinent one for the purpose of this thesis relates to the argument held by the Court 
about that States must refrain from “the establishment of measures designed to eli-
minate responsibility.”60 In a decision made the same year than the Myrna Mack case, 
the Court established that the guarantee of non-repetition includes the adoption of 
legislative measures to adjust the domestic legal system to international human ri-
ghts standards.61 The Court decided in another case that the Guatemalan State had 
to make legislative and administrative measures in order to guarantee fair criminal 
procedures in favor of indictees to death.62 The Barrios Altos judgment on repara-
tions is also relevant because it shows the State’s agreement to include a definition of 
the crime of extra-judicial execution and ratify the International Convention on the 
Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Huma-
nity.63 The Molina-Thiessen case includes as a non-pecuniary measure of reparation 
the adoption of legislation to establish a procedure “to allow the statement of absence 
and presumption of death due to forced disappearance (…)”64 In Hilaire v. Trinidad 
& Tobago the Court turns to impose as reparation not the creation but the change of 
the wording of the Offences Against the Person Act “into compliance with the Ameri-
can Convention and other international human rights norms.”65 In Trujillo-Oroza v. 
de Siglo: 1979-2004 TheJurisprudence of the Inter American Court of Human Rightsregardin-
gReparation, in The Inter American Court of Human Rights – 1979-2004 3 (2005)
55 Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparation, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct.H.R. (ser. C) No. 101, 250-286 (Nov. 25, 2003).
56 Id, 250-266.
57 Id, 268.
58 Id, 274 – 275.
59 Id, 278.
60 The court expresses that “ […] the State must ensure that the domestic proceeding to inves-
tigate and punish those responsible for the facts in this case attains its due effects and, specifi-
cally, it must abstain from resorting to legal concepts such as amnesty, extinguishment, and the 
establishment of measures designed to eliminate responsibility(...)”Id, ¶ 276.
61 Bulacio v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No 100, ¶162.5 (Sep. 18, 2003).
62 Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No 126, ¶130(d) (Jun. 20, 2005).
63 Barrios Altos v. Peru, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 87, 
¶44(b)(c) (Nov. 30, 2001).
64 Molina-Theissen v. Guatemala, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 108, ¶91 (Jul. 3, 2004).
65 Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, supra note 38, ¶212; See, Blanco-Romero et al v. Venezuela, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 138, ¶104 (Nov. 28, 
2005) (The Court holds that the State must adopt the necessary legislative measures to make 
the writ of habeas corpus granted in cases of forced disappearances).
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Bolivia the Court sustains that since Bolivia had not defined the forced disappearan-
ce as a crime in its legislation, effective investigations to clarify the crimes against Mr. 
Trujillo had not been done, so it ordered to take the necessary legislative measures as 
part of the State’s reparation duties.66
1.4 Statutes of Limitations
 
The States’ compliance with their international legal obligations is also rela-
ted to the non-establishment of statutory limitations regarding crimes against hu-
manity. The Colombian legislation has statutory limitations regulated, which pose 
some questions on its acquiescence with international standards in terms of its 
duties to ensure, respect human rights, and provide effective remedies. In order to 
better understand the applicable international legal framework pertaining to this 
topic, the decisions made in this regard by the Inter American Court in Velásquez-
-Rodríguez, Almonacid-Arellano, and Barrios Altos are going to be briefly studied. 
The Court states in the Velásquez-Rodríguez case that any investigation 
must be directed by the State “as its own legal duty”67 and that the effectiveness 
of its actions is evaluated in consideration of its efforts \towards the punishment 
of crimes.68 Following this reasoning, the Court decides in the Goiburú case that 
the State had the obligation to carry out investigations in order to determine the 
intellectual and material responsibilities in the human rights violations.69 The com-
pliance of States with these responsibilities is certainly questioned when there are 
no effective legislative measures. As mentioned before, States start creating legal 
guarantees either by annulling laws which imply a violation of the rights protected, 
or by passing laws tending to guarantee the observance of human rights.70
The Almonacid and Barrios Altos cases have some provision related to the 
prohibition of statutes of limitations. The Barrios Altos judgment is particularly 
relevant. It states that the existence of statutory limitations, and any measures to 
eliminate responsibility are prohibited.71 The Court holds in the same decision that 
such measures are prohibited when human rights violations such as extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions, among other crimes, have been committed. The 
Almonacid decision goes further. The Court states that the non-application of sta-
tutory limitations to these crimes is a norm of jus cogens.72 The aforementioned 
decisions are not the only sources which underlie Colombia’s obligations on the 
non-applicability of statutes of limitations on crimes against humanity. 
66 Trujillo-Oroza v. Bolivia, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
92, ¶96 – 98 (Feb. 27, 2002).
67 Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, supra note 33, 177 (Jul. 29, 1988).
68 Id.
69 Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 153, 192.5 (Sep. 22, 2006).
70 Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No 154, 118 (Sep. 26, 2006).
71 Barrios Altos v. Peru, supra note 63, 41.
72 Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, supra note 70, 153.
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Even though the ICCPR does not have any provision pertaining to the pro-
hibition of these types of measures, the Human Rights Committee has made some 
observations with this respect. Hence, the Committee mentions in its concluding 
observations related to the crimes committed by the military junta in Argentina 
that “[g]ross violations of civil and political rights during military rule should 
be prosecutable for as long as necessary, with applicability as far back in time as 
necessary to bring their perpetrators to justice.”73 In its General Comment 31 
it also says that States obligations to initiate prosecutions “arise notably” with 
respect to the responsible perpetrators of the crimes of summary and arbitrary 
killing, enforced disappearance, torture and similar cruel, inhuman and degra-
ding treatment, recognized as such either by domestic or international law.74 It 
also mentions that when the former crimes are “committed as part of a widespre-
ad or systematic attack on a civilian population, these violations of the Covenant 
are crimes against humanity.”75
Ruth A. Kok mentions that there is international case law which recogni-
zes the imprescriptibility of international crimes.76 She cites some decisions held 
by the former European Commission on Human Rights (EComHR) and the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) supporting the former assessment. Thus, 
she mentions that in Touvier v. France the EComHR states that crimes against 
humanity are imprescriptible.77 She also says that the ECtHR then takes the 
same approach than the Commission in Papon v. France and Kolk and Kislyiy v. 
Estonia where it states that “there is no individual right to statutes of limitation 
to international crimes.78
The Rome Statute, to which Colombia is part of,79 has a provision on this mat-
ter. Article 29 states that “[t]he crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not 
be subject to any statute of limitations.”80 Cassese mentions that “[i]t appears to be a 
sounder view that specific customary rules render statutes of limitations inapplicable 
with regard to some crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, torture.”81 Van den 
Wyngaert and Dugard follow the same reasoning. They say that there is enough evi-
dence to the view that the prohibition of core crimes, which are the ones included in 
the Rome Statute, is a jus cogens norm, “and that a necessary consequence of such a 
characterization is the inapplicability of statutory limitations.”82
73 See UN Doc. CCPR/CO/70/ARG (3 November 2000), Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Committee: Argentina, 9.
74 General Comment 31, supra note 3,18.
75 Id, 18
76 ruTh a. kok, sTaTuToTry limiTaTion in inTernaTional Criminal law 358 (2001).
77 Id.
78 Id, 359.
79 See status of ratification in United Nations Treaty Collection: Status of Treaties: Rome 
Statute, at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=1&mtd
sg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&lang=en#Participants.
80 Rome Statute, art. 29.
81 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law 319 (2003).
82 Christine Van den Wyngaert& John Dugard, Non-Applicability of Statute of Limitations in The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Vol 1) 887 ( Antonio Cassese 
et. al. eds., 2002).
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The Rome Statute also pushes for the prevalence of States’ work to crimi-
nally prosecute the perpetrators of international crimes over the International 
Criminal Court’s jurisdiction. The preamble of the Rome Statute, which accor-
ding to the Vienna Convention on the law of the treaties plays an important role 
in the interpretation of a treaty,83 states that effective prosecutions of internatio-
nal crimes “must be ensured by taking the necessary measures at the national 
level.”84 It also recalls that it is “the duty of every State to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.”85 Thus, State Par-
ties to the Statute are the ones which have to undertake all necessary criminal 
proceedings in order to achieve justice when serious international crimes have 
been perpetrated.86 This duty entails the obligation to take the necessary legis-
lative measures to be able to do effective prosecutions. If States do not carry out 
their responsibilities, the International Criminal Court can enter into play.87
The responsibility to ensure human rights is posed on States. They are 
the ones who are entitled to determine the legislation throughout which the ad-
ministration of justice becomes feasible. Hence, the judicial apparatus is able to 
work efficiently when it has the necessary legal tools to do prosecutions for crimes 
against humanity. When there is no legal inclusion of all of these crimes and the 
ordinary national criminal types do not reach the minimum international standar-
ds to determine individual criminal responsibilities, as it is going to be evidenced 
in the next chapters, the lack of legislation negatively impacts the possibility to 
comply with the obligation to ensure human rights. This deficiency prompts the 
inclusion of statutory limitations without distinction of the crimes to which they 
are not applicable, which prevent victims to have access to judicial remedies. These 
insufficiencies impede States to give effect to the Rome Statute, the complemen-
tarity principle and provisions on the principle of legality, which open the door to 
question their willingness or inability to undertake effective criminal proceedings.
The principle of legality is regulated in the ICCPR , the ACHR and the Rome 
Statute. Article 15 of the Covenant establishes that no individual can be held guilty 
of criminal offences which at the moment of the act or omission were not conside-
red as such by national or international law.88 Article 9 of the American Convention 
states that no one can be sentenced for any act or omission that was not conside-
red to be criminal under the applicable law at the time of commission.89 Article 
22 of the Rome Statute states a similar definition of the principle and adds that 
a crime has to be “strictly construed” and that in cases of ambiguity such defini-
tion “shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted 
or convicted.”90 The Inter-American Court has developed in its jurisprudence a 
83 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [VCLT], UN Doc.A/Conf.39/27; 1155 UNTS 331; 
8 ILM 679 (1969).
84 Id, Preamble.
85 Id.
86 Rome Statute, art. 17.
87 Rome Statute, art. 17(1)(a)(b).
88 ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 15.
89 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 31, art. 9.
90 Rome Statute, art. 22 (2).
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similar understanding as the one that the Rome Statute has in regard to this prin-
ciple. This Court says that criminal norms have to be clear and precise. In Castillo-
-Petruzzi the Court states that in order to fully comply with the aforementioned 
principle, “crimes must be classified and described in precise and unambiguous 
language that narrowly defines the punishable offense.”91 The Court further states 
that any ambiguity in the description of crimes may lead to the abuse of power.92 In 
De La Cruz-Florez v. Peru, the Court reiterates its former assertions and adds that 
democratic systems have to be cautious and “ensure that punitive measures are 
adopted with absolute respect for the basic rights of the individual, and subject to 
careful verification of whether or not an unlawful behavior exists.”93
The legislative incorporation or implementation by States of each one of the 
rights included in the treaties which have been evaluated does not have any efficacy 
when there are no feasible ways of enforcement. The most likely mean to guarantee 
the full realization of the rights of all the individuals involved in, and affected by 
criminal acts, is the codification of crimes with their correspondent penalties. The 
victim finds redress when the offense against him is punished. The indictee finds 
justice when his prosecution is in accordance with the principle of legality. Any 
fissure in the determination of criminal offenses may imbalance the fairness of the 
process. When such a thing happens, the victim might find a barrier to judicially 
dismantle the truth and the indictee would see that his right to a fair trial is not 
respected because of the fissures in the compliance with the principle of legality. 
This point is developed in a more extensive way in chapter 2, point 2.4. 
The following chapters will evidence that the absence of legislative provi-
sions about crimes against humanity breaches the possibility to establish crimi-
nal responsibilities and as a result, the effective protection of victims’ rights. It 
will be also seen that the non-legislation of these crimes fosters misunderstan-
dings within the executive and judiciary branches which have repercussions in 
the way how justice is administered. The result is that the rights of all parties 
in the criminal processes are not fully protected. These insufficiencies impede 
States to give effect to the Rome Statute’s complementarity principle. As such, 
by understanding all international obligations derived from the instruments to 
which Colombia is a State Party, the conclusion is that this State has the duty to 
legislate crimes against humanity.94
91 Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser.C) No. 52, 121  (May. 30, 1999); Cantoral-Benavides v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 69, 157 (Aug. 18, 2000).
92 Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, supra note 91, 121; Cantoral-Benavides v. Peru, supra note 91, 157.
93 Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser.C) No. 72, 81 (Feb. 2, 2001).
94 Werle points out that the Rome Statute’s goal is to “serve as a source of norms and legal stan-
dards that would provide states themselves with the basis to effectively investigate and pros-
ecute the most serious crimes under international law themselves. Gerard Werle, Principles of 
International Criminal Law, 118 – 119 (2nd ed. 2009).
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2 Breaches of the International Obligations of Colombia due 
to the Lack of National Legislation Typifying Crimes Against 
Humanity
The purpose of the current section is to explain how the legislature and 
the judiciary have addressed the definition of crimes against humanity. In 
order to do this, the debates held by Congress about whether to typify or not 
these types of crimes will be briefly explained. The approach of the executive 
branch to this topic and some holdings of the Constitutional and Supreme 
Courts on the qualification given to certain conducts as crimes against hu-
manity will also be included. The goal of these explanations is to show that 
the omission of the legislative branch has repercussion over the way how the 
executive approaches the existence of a human right or humanitarian law vio-
lation, and the manner throughout which the judiciary has qualified certain 
criminal offenses as crimes against humanity.
Law is supposed to be characterized for its clarity. The determination of 
clear legal concepts allows people to have security on what the law provides. In 
this regard Cacciaguidi-Fahy and Wagner say that “[c]larity at law is customarily 
equated to certainty.”95 Language is obscure when it does not have an understan-
dable meaning: “texts may be considered incoherent where different possible me-
anings suggest themselves, but are excluded because they lead to contradiction.”96 
The need for certainty becomes central in the administration of justice. When 
criminal matters are under consideration, precision is vital. War crimes and cri-
mes against humanity are legal concepts whose particularities should be clearly 
defined in the law and jurisprudence.
The following explanation regards to the debates which were held by Con-
gress between 1998 and 1999 about the codification of crimes against humanity. 
It is noteworthy the fact that those discussions developed mainly after the Rome 
Statute was signed by Colombia. Thus, Government and Congress already knew 
how the crimes, which are under the competency of the International Criminal 
Court, were defined in the Rome Statute. The purpose of the next description is 
to highlight the ambiguity evidenced in the understanding of the legislative body, 
the government, and also the Constitutional and Supreme Courts about the diffe-
rences between both types of crimes.
2.1 Legislative debates about the definition of crimes against 
humanity
Congress started the debates about the codification of crimes against hu-
manity after the government presented a proposal to legislate on forced disappea-
95 Sophie Cacciaguidi-Fahy& Anne Wagner, Searching for Clarity, in legal language anD The 
searCh for ClariTy, praCTiCe anD Tools 19, 19 (Wagner &Cacciaguidi-Fahy ed., 2006).
96 Ross Charnock, Clear Ambiguity, in Legal Language and the Search for Clarity, Practice 
and Tools 65, 69 (Wagner &Cacciaguidi-Fahy ed., 2006).
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rance, genocide, and torture under a section named “crimes against humanity.”97 
Government justified the necessity to legislate the aforesaid three crimes due to 
their gravity.98 Both, government and Congress made good general explanations 
about what crimes against humanity are and how they have evolved after World 
War II.99 It was also explained how the Rome Statute defines such crimes, their 
widespread and systematic elements, and their independence in regard to the 
existence of an armed conflict to determine that any of them have been com-
mitted.100 Nevertheless, Congressmen showed lack of understanding about the 
difference between war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
Their misunderstanding about this distinction led Congress to exclude the 
possibility to group the three crimes under study in a specific section of the Code 
named crimes against humanity. It is worth mentioning the fact that their analy-
sis was mainly based on the differences between the description of crimes in the 
Rome Statute and the Colombian Criminal Code. They explained that due to 
the connection between war crimes and crimes against humanity, it was difficult 
to make a clear differentiation between both of them.101 Another difficulty that 
they found was that the expression “widespread or systematic” regarded only 
to a state policy or political organization and not to plans determined by illegal 
armed groups.102 They added that because the sanction imposed due to crimes 
against humanity could be lower than the one imposed due to a conviction for 
multiple crimes, the punishment of the first would not have relation with its 
gravity.103Here are someexcerpts of theircomments:
“Tal concepción de los Crímenes de Lesa Humanidad resulta de 
difícil prueba en el caso colombiano y podría conducir a que solo 
los agentes del Estado sean considerados autores de tales conduc-
tas. Adicionalmente, presenta dificultades de orden dogmático, 
como la de que la pena por del delito de lesa humanidad podría ser 
inferior a la correspondiente a un concurso material de delitos. 
Por estas razones es que en el proyecto se prefirió la exclusión de 
un título especial denominado “Lesa Humanidad” y en su lugar 
busca sancionar estas conductas como delitos graves, gravedad 
que viene determinada por la pena imponible.”104
The former argumentation demonstrates the lack of understanding of in-
ternational human rights law and international humanitarian law.105 This inap-
propriateness is also evidenced in the categorization that they do of crimes against 
97 Gaceta del Congreso 126, Proyecto de Ley No 20 de 1998, 22 de julio de 1998, p. 23 – 27.
98 Id.
99 Gaceta del Congreso 185 Proyecto de Ley No 20 de 1998, 17 de septiembre de 1998; Gaceta 
del Congreso 369, Proyecto de Ley No 20 de 1998, 23 de diciembre de 1998; Gaceta del Congreso 
37, Proyecto de Ley No 20, 7 de abril de 1999; Gaceta del Congreso 450, Proyecto de Ley No 20, 
18 de noviembre de 1999.
100 Gaceta del Congreso 185, supra note 99, p. 6.
101 Gaceta del Congreso 450, Proyecto de Ley No 20 de 1998, 18 de noviembre de 1999, p. 6.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id, p. 6. [Emphasis added].
105 See International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000).
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humanity under international humanitarian law: “[l]osdelitosquebuscatipifica-
resta ley son denominadospor el Derecho Internacional Humanitario, “Crímenes 
de LesaHumanidad”.”106 This classification suggests that for the legislature there 
is no distinction between war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
2.2 The executive approach on crimes against humanity
The government made the same mistake. The “Presidential Program of 
Human Righs and International Humanitarian Law” wrote a document whose 
purpose was to guide the judicial officers in their daily practice. Itwascalled “Pro-
tocolo para el reconocimiento de casos de violaciones a los Derechos Humanos e 
infracciones al Derecho Internacional Humanitario, con énfasis en el homicidio 
en persona protegida” (hereinafter “theProtocol”).107The Protocol contains some 
considerations on crimes against humanity and describes when an action cons-
titutes a human rights or an international humanitarian law violation. Never-
theless, the said purpose to instruct judicial personnel about how to recognize a 
human right and a humanitarian law violation is not reached.
The language used in the Protocol is confusing. Forinstance, itwrongly 
describes thecrimescontained in theColombian Criminal Code as iftheyhadthe-
characteristics of warcrimes and crimesagainsthumanity: “en Colombia existe 
un Código Penal que contiene delitos concebidos por el Estatuto de Roma como 
delitos de lesa humanidad, o aquellos definidos como crímenes de Guerra.”108 
The Colombian Criminal Code has only ordinary crimes and war crimes legis-
lated. The document also shows the same conclusion than Congress about the 
undetermined character of crimes against humanity and how this undetermi-
nation makes their prosecution difficult: “el peligro de la consagración de tipos-
penalesextremadamenteindeterminados, en blanco […] condujo a los legislado-
resaincorporarlasconductasdentro de aquellostítulosqueconsagranbienesjurídic
ostradicionales.”109 This kind of conclusion does not suggest how an effective 
prosecution of perpetrators of war crimes and/or crimes against humanity can 
be done. Neither does it instruct the juridical personnel about the differences 
between a human right violation and breaches to international humanitarian 
law norms. This type of assessment does not either help to understand the way 
how the norms of the Criminal Code, about which the protocol say that protect 
“bienesjurídicostradicionales”, can be employed to vindicate the rights of victi-
ms of crimes against humanity.
106 Supra note 101.
107 See <http://www.derechoshumanos.gov.co/LuchaImpunidad/Documents/2010/Protocolo_para_
reconocimiento_de_casos.pdf> (Last visited March 7, 2011).
108 Vicepresidencia de la República de Colombia – Programa Presidencial de Derechos Huma-
nos y DIH, Protocolo para el reconocimiento de casos de violaciones a los Derechos Humanos 
e infracciones al Derecho International Humanitario, con énfasis en el homicidio en persona 
protegida [Protocolo], Julio de 2008, p. 16.
109 Id, p. 18.
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2.3 The judiciary’s approach on the definition of crimes against 
humanity
The same kind of misperception can be found in the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional and Supreme Courts of Colombia. Now this section turns to the 
analysis of how these tribunals have addressed the characteristics of crimes 
against humanity in some of their decisions. The purpose of this explanation is 
to show that an improper use of certain terms may sometimes be just a matter of 
form, but in other cases it may have consequence on substantial issues. 
In the judgment SU-1184 of 2001 the Constitutional Court of Colombia 
analyzed the cases concerning members of the military forces, when they can be 
held criminally responsible due to their official position.110 The court first explains 
that soldiers cannot be prosecuted by criminal military judges when the crime that 
they had committed goes beyond the fulfillment of their military functions.111 In 
these cases the prosecution has to be done by judges of the ordinary criminal juris-
diction.112 This holding was well founded; however, there is a section in which the 
qualification of the crime used to prosecute the army members is not clear.
The Court asserts that unless juridical or factual obstacles impede military 
officers to prevent human rights violations, they may be held responsible for cri-
mes against humanity. However, the qualification that the Court makes of these 
types of offenses is unclear. It cites as examples of crimes against humanity tortu-
re, forced prostitution, forced displacement, and other crimes contained in article 
7 of the Rome Statute. However, offenseswhich are categorized as warcrimesun-
derinternationalhumanitarianlaw rules are alsoconsidered as crimesagainsthu-
manitybytheCourt: “conductas calificables de lesa humanidad, como i) las viola-
ciones a las prohibiciones fijadas en el protocolo II a los acuerdos de Ginebra -y en 
general al derecho internacional humanitario- o a los tratados sobre restricciones 
al uso de armas en la guerra […] ii) las acciones contra bienes culturales durante 
la guerra y los conflictos armados internos.”113TheCourtconcludesthatthequalif
ication of the criminal conduct has to be as crimeagainsthumanity: “el título de 
imputación se hace por el delito de lesa humanidad, o en general por las graves 
violaciones a los derechos humanos.”114 This reasoning does not lead to an indis-
putable conclusion about how the denomination of the criminal charge should 
be done. This confusion is caused by the fact that while the omission to prevent 
a human right violation is described by the Court as a crime against humanity, 
the offenses that the Court lists under this denomination are mainly war crimes. 
The analysis of the way how army members may be held responsible due to their 
negligence to prevent human rights violations needs more precision. The context 
of the crime plays an important role on this point. Thus, the consideration of the 
110 Corte Constitucional de Colombia [C.C.] [ConstitutionalCourt] noviembre 13, 2001. Senten-
cia SU-1184 de 2001, M.P: E. Montealegre (Colom.).
111 Id, Whereas 18 – 19.
112 Id.
113 Id, Whereas 17.
114 Id, Whereas 18.
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widespread and/or systematic nature of crimes against humanity in contrast to 
the necessary link of war crimes with an armed conflict is relevant.115
Another decision of the Constitutional Court is Judgment C-291 of 2007, 
which is referred to the study of the war crime of homicide of a protected per-
son.116 In this judgment the Court first explains how the interpretation of inter-
national norms has to be done in accordance to the Colombian Constitution. It 
then characterizes the war crime of homicide against a protected person. 
With respect to the first point, the tribunal describes that the constitutio-
nal block [bloque de constitucionalidad] is the mean throughout which interna-
tional treaties acquire constitutional hierarchy within the national jurisdiction.117 
It clarifies that human rights treaties and customary and conventional norms on 
international humanitarian law are part of the constitutional block.118 It further 
explains that the Court has the duty to give effect to the limits determined by 
the constitutional block when the legislature has not taken them into account.119 
The Court also mentions that the rules of the block have to be considered by the 
judges in their different decisions and that national legislation has to be adjusted 
to the content of the Constitution and the constitutional block.120
After this analysis, the tribunal evaluates the crime of homicide on a pro-
tected person based on the constitutional block. Hence, it first explains how the 
evolution of international humanitarian law and the applicable rules of internal 
armed conflicts with respect to the treatment of combatants and civilians.121 It 
mentions that attacks against civilian populations during armed conflicts may 
constitute not only war crimes but crimes against humanity.122 It also states that 
the crime of homicide of a protected person constitutes a war crime and may also 
configure other crimes under international humanitarian law: genocide and the 
crimes against humanity of persecution and attacks against civilians.123 It may be 
115 Ximena Medellín, Digesto de Jurisprudencia Latinoamericana sobre Crímenes de Dere-
cho Internacional 186 (2009).
116 “HOMICIDIO EN PERSONA PROTEGIDA. El que, con ocasión y en desarrollo de conflicto 
armado, ocasione la muerte de persona protegida conforme a los Convenios Internacionales so-
bre Derecho Humanitario ratificados por Colombia, incurrirá en prisión […] multa […] PARÁ-
GRAFO. Para los efectos de este artículo y las demás normas del presente título se entiende 
por personas Protegidas conforme al derecho internacional humanitario: 1. Los integrantes de 
la población civil. 2. Las personas que no participan en hostilidades y los civiles en poder de la 
parte adversa. 3. Los heridos, enfermos o náufragos puestos fuera de combate. 4. El personal 
sanitario o religioso. 5. Los periodistas en misión o corresponsales de guerra acreditados. 6. 
Los combatientes que hayan depuesto las armas por captura, rendición u otra causa análoga. 
7. Quienes antes del comienzo de las hostilidades fueren considerados como apátridas o refu-
giados. 8. Cualquier otra persona que tenga aquella condición en virtud de los Convenios I, II, 
III y IV de Ginebra de 1949 y los Protocolos Adicionales I y II de 1977 y otros que llegaren a 
ratificarse.” Código Penal [C.Pen.] [Criminal Code] art. 135 (Col.). 
117 [C.C.] abril 22, 2007. Sentencia C-291 de 2007, M.P: M. Cepeda (Colom.) Whereas III(c); 
seealso Sentencia C-225 de 1995, Sentencia C-067 de 2003, Sentencia C-028 de 2006, Sentencia 
C-047 de 2006, Sentencia C-488 de 2009.
118 [C.C.] Sentencia C-291 de 2007, supra note 117, Whereas III(c).
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id, Whereas 2.
122 Id, Whereas 3.4.1.
123 Id, Whereas 5.4.3.
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observed that the Court fails again in the characterization of independent offen-
ses as crimes under international humanitarian law:
[I]ndependientmente de la posible configuración del crimen de 
guerra de homicidio en persona civil o en persona fuera de com-
bate […] el acto material subyacente, v.g. el de tomar la vida de 
una persona amparada por el principio de distinción, puede dar 
lugar a la configuración de otros tipos de delitos bajo el Derecho 
Internacional Humanitario, entre los cuales se cuentan el genoci-
dio y los crímenes de lesa humanidad de exterminio, persecución, 
ataques contra civiles o violencia contra la persona; depende en 
cada caso del contexto en el cual se cometió el acto y de la presen-
cia de las distintas condiciones específicas para la configuración de 
estas figuras delictivas.124
Even though the Court makes a distinction between crimes against huma-
nity and war crimes, the cited judgments do not succeed in explaining how the 
protection of civilians in regard to both regimes individually considered should be. 
Crimes against humanity are categorized as crimes under international humani-
tarian law in the second decision, while the first judgment situates international 
humanitarian norms as a category of crimes against humanity. This confusion 
raises doubts about how the protection of victims of a murder as a crime against 
humanity can be effective if there is no clear differentiation between these two 
different types of crimes. The common widespread and systematic elements to 
all crimes against humanity are neither described in the crime of homicide of a 
protected person nor in the common crime of murder under the applicable Co-
lombian law.125 The same happens with the mental element of the crime against 
humanity of murder, which is the awareness of the perpetrator about the crime’s 
widespread or systematic nature.126 The relevance of these judgments is that they 
have had repercussion on the way how the Supreme Court of Colombia has dealt 
with prosecutions where the responsibility of massive murders is at issue. 
Two cases which were decided by the Cassation Criminal Chamber of the 
Supreme Court exemplify the difficulty to reach an accurate decision. The first 
judgment is from September 21st of 2009,127 and the second one is from January 
124 Id, Whereas 5.4.3. (Emphasis added)
125 “HOMICIDIO. El que matare a otro, incurrirá en prisión de doscientos ocho (208) a cuatrocien-
tos cincuenta (450) meses.” C.Pen. art. 103 (Col.). “CIRCUNSTANCIAS DE AGRAVACIÓN PU-
NITIVA. La pena será de cuatrocientos (400) a seiscientos (600) meses de prisión, si la conducta 
descrita en el artículo anterior se cometiere: […] 9. En persona internacionalmente protegida 
diferente a las contempladas en el Título II de éste Libro y agentes diplomáticos, de conformidad 
con los Tratados y Convenios Internacionales ratificados por Colombia.” C.Pen. art.104 (Col.).
The Supreme Court has said that public servers who represent the State in other countries 
and their families are the international protected persons contemplated in the cited paragraph. 
Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [SupremeCourt], Sala. Pen, Enero 27, 2010, M.P: J. Bustos, 
Proceso No. 29753 (Colom.).
126 Antonio Cassesse, International Criminal Law 54 (2nd Ed. 2008).
127 [C.S.J.] Sala. Pen, Septiembre 21, 2009, M.P: S. Espinosa, Proceso No. 32022 (Colom.).
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27th of 2010.128 Both decisions are about processes pertaining to the prosecution 
of former paramilitaries.
In the first judgment the Court decides an appeal of the lawyers of the vic-
tims (hereinafter “the lawyers”) against a decision made by the Justice and Peace 
Chamber of the Superior Tribunal of Bogota.129 The indictee, Gian Carlo Gutiér-
rez, was part of the Calima block of the United Self-Defenses of Colombia (AUC) 
for three years.130 He confessed his participation in more than 20 homicides, 5 
kidnappings and illegal use of weapons and official uniforms.131 He was sentenced 
to imprisonment for the former crimes amongst others.132 He was declared guilty 
of homicide on protected persons.133
The lawyers appealed the qualification of the crimes arguing that they do 
not show how their perpetration was a response to a predetermined plan and how 
the criminal organization was structured.134 Thus, one of them mentions that 
the charge for war crimes does not recognize the fact that Gutiérrez was well 
known for creating terror within the population in the area were the crimes were 
committed.135 The lawyers also say that because the crimes perpetrated by the 
indictee were crimes against humanity, their qualification had to be under such 
denomination and not as war crimes.136
The Court analyzes the arguments of the lawyers and points out the differen-
ces between war crimes and crimes against humanity based on the jurisprudence of 
the Constitutional Court; however, it does not give an appropriate response to the 
allegations of the appellants. The tribunal argues that the multiple perpetration of 
crimes against the population affected by the acts of Gutiérrez have the category of 
crimes against humanity.137 Nonetheless, the Court then contradicts itself. It states 
that the legal issue at study is complex because its solution has to deal between the 
application of norms which sanction violations of international humanitarian law 
and common crimes which may become crimes against humanity.138
128 [C.S.J.] Sala. Pen, Enero 27, 2010, M.P: J. Bustos, Proceso No. 29753 (Colom.).
129 [C.S.J.] supra note 127.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id, Whereas 7.
133 Id, Whereas 7.
134 Id, Whereas. 12.2 (1.3) - (1.4).
135 “[T]enía dominio sobre quién y a quién se debía asesinar, y cuáles eran las motivaciones. 
El hecho de haber sido policía le permitía tener una relación permanente con los miembros de 
esa institución en El Tambo y coordinar operativos con las estructuras paramilitares, situacio-
nes que no son mencionadas por el postulado en ninguna de las versiones libres.” (C.S.J.) Id, 
Whereas. 12.2 (1.3).
136 Id, Whereas. 12.2 (1.3) - (1.4).
137 “Los asesinatos, torturas, masacres, desapariciones, desplazamientos forzados, violaciones, 
y en fin, las múltiples violaciones sistemáticas a los derechos humanos confesadas hasta el mo-
mento por los desmovilizados de esos grupos armados que han sido escuchados […] no dejan 
duda de que se configuran las características esenciales que delinean los delitos de lesa humani-
dad.” [C.S.J.] Id, Whereas 4.
138 “[A]unque no son incompatibles, no puede a la hora de efectuarse la adecuación típica de los 
hechos juzgados, ubicarse unas conductas dentro del contexto del Título II, Capítulo I del Código 
Penal, y otras, ocurridas en el mismo contexto, por fuera de él, sin una argumentación válida que 
lo justifique.” [C.S.J.] Id, Whereas 4.
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The unclear explanation of the Court might be the result of the fact that 
none of the crimes of murder typified in the Criminal Code have the widespread 
or systematic elements of homicide as a crime against humanity. The Court pro-
bably doubts about the way how the indictment should be done now that its limits 
to declare the criminal responsibility of someone are established by the legislated 
national offenses. This is an obstacle to meet international standards. The same 
difficulty is also evidenced in the second judgment of the Supreme Court.
The second decision relates to the killing of members of the Kankuamo’s 
indigenous community in December of 2002 by 60 paramilitaries.139 The Court 
acts in this judgment as a court of cassation. The indictees were two siblings: Ma-
rio and Geiber Fuentes. 140 The first one was declared responsible for the crimes 
of homicide on protected persons, the common crime of murder aggravated for 
the killing of an international protected person, and qualified onspiracy.141Geiber 
Fuentes was sentenced for the perpetration of the third aforementioned crime.142
The Court studies the charges and says that the sentence against Fuentes 
is incorrect.143 The tribunal argues that civilians are not considered protected 
individuals under the ninth aggravating cause of this crime in the Colombian 
Criminal Code.144 The Court decides that he should not be guilty of that crimi-
nal offense but of the war crime of homicide.145 It then characterizes this crime 
by explaining that it may be done in the context of a combat, but also in places 
when there is not armed confrontation.146 It further explains that the killings 
of the Kankuamo community members were a component of the paramilitaries’ 
strategy against people who were supposed to be guerrilla aiders.147 The tribunal 
also mentions that when an illegal armed group invades a town and the criminal 
organization is present in the region, under the orders of a command, and its 
members perpetrate homicides against the civilian population, such crimes fit the 
characteristics of the war crime of murder:148
139 [C.S.J.] supra note 128.
140 Id.
141 “CONCIERTO PARA DELINQUIR. Cuando varias personas se concierten con el fin de com-
eter delitos, cada una de ellas será penada, por esa sola conducta, con prisión de cuarenta y ocho 
(48) a ciento ocho (108) meses. Cuando el concierto sea para cometer delitos de genocidio, desa-
parición forzada de personas, tortura, desplazamiento forzado, homicidio, terrorismo, tráfico de 
drogas tóxicas, estupefacientes o sustancias sicotrópicas, secuestro, secuestro extorsivo, extorsión, 
enriquecimiento ilícito, lavado de activos o testaferrato y conexos, o Financiamiento del Ter-
rorismo y administración de recursos relacionados con actividades terroristas, la pena será de 
prisión de ocho (8) a dieciocho (18) años y multa de dos mil setecientos (2700) hasta treinta mil 
(30000) salarios mínimos legales mensuales vigentes. La pena privativa de la libertad se aumen-
tará en la mitad para quienes organicen, fomenten, promuevan, dirijan, encabecen, constituyan 
o financien el concierto para delinquir.” C.Pen. art.340 (Col.). 
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“En consecuencia, no existe duda alguna que se cierna acerca de la 
autoría y responsabilidad de estos crímenes en cabeza de los miem-
bros de las Autodefensas que participaron en la toma de Atánquez, 
con independencia del rol que cada uno cumpliera […] todos esos 
actos apuntan en una misma dirección: hacer posible la ejecución 
del plan criminal que los condujo a tomarse el Corregimiento de 
Atánquez, con miras a matar a varios de sus pobladores […]
[E]l mismo testigo fue claro en mencionar que vio a MARIO y a 
GEIBER FUENTES MONTAÑO, junto con alias EL PAISA, como 
parte de un grupo de al menos sesenta paramilitares, el día en que 
mataron a ABEL ALVARADO MAESTRE y a otros tres habitantes 
de Atánquez […] explicando que pudo reconocerlos porque le hicieron 
abrir la tienda de su propiedad para que le vendieran gaseosa, mo-
mento en que llevaban con ellos al Mamo indígena en cuestión.”149
The former argumentation about why the crime of homicide of a protected 
person was the applicable criminal offense to the specific case suggests that such 
qualification does not fit the circumstances under which it was committed. The 
analysis of the wording of the crime as described in the Criminal Code shows 
that the only individual who may be held responsible is its direct perpetrator.150 
There is no mention of whether Geiber Fuentes committed a crime of murder. It 
seems that he was indicted due to his involvement in the criminal organization. 
The description that the Court does of his participation in criminal acts against 
the Kankuamos relates more to the elements of the crime against humanity of 
attack directed against a civilian population as described in article 7 of the Rome 
Statute,151 but not to any of the crimes contained in the national legislation. 
2.4 Under and over inclusion of international norms in national 
offenses
It may be observed from what have been described that although Colombian 
high Courts have tried to characterize criminal actions which amount to internatio-
nal crimes by making constant reference to international law, the results of such ac-
tivity sometimes trigger an unfair administration of justice. Even when the interpre-
tation of national norms by making use of the constitutional block tries to push for 
the compliance of the State with its international obligations, a barrier is found on 
the fact that a civil law system restricts the possibility to do any indictments by going 
beyond the constitutive elements of national crimes typified in the criminal statutes. 
149 Id.
150 “El que, con ocasión y en desarrollo del conflicto armado, ocasione la muerte de persona 
protegida conforme a los Convenios Internacionales sobre Derecho Humanitario ratificados por 
Colombia[…]” [C.Pen.] art 135 (Col.).
151 “[…] 2. For the purpose of paragraph 1: (a) “Attack directed against any civilian population” 
means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 
against any civilian population pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organization policy to 
commit such attack.” Rome Statute art.7, para.1(a), 2 (a).
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This situation may lead to two obstacles which have been called by Ferdinandusse as 
underinclusion and overinclusion of core international crimes.152
The Colombian case shows that there is in fact underinclusion. This becomes 
evident in the misapplication of the crime of murder as a crime against humanity 
under the Rome Statute vis a vis the common crime of murder and the war crime of 
homicide in the Colombian legislation. XimenaMedellín explains that when national 
crimes do not have any of the constitutive elements of core international crimes, the-
re is no way to make any equivalence between both kinds of offenses.153 Hugo Relva 
makes an analysis in this regard by saying that when treaties compel states to pre-
vent and punish crimes, such acts are punishable within domestic jurisdictions when 
a national rule has been established; this has not happened in Colombia:
“In Latin American countries […] if instead of recognizing rights 
the treaty prohibits certain acts, and imposes on states parties an 
obligation to prevent and punish them, it cannot be asserted that 
such acts are punishable under domestic legislation unless a sub-
sequent legal rule has been passed expressly punishing them […] 
this principle always involves the enactment of additional domes-
tic laws to criminalize such acts and specify penalties.”154
The aforesaid states’ duty to legislate crimes and their correspondent pe-
nalties is linked to the to the principle of nullum crime sine lege,nullapena sine 
lege.155 In this respect, it is important to remember, as the previous chapter men-
tioned, that the Inter-American Court has expressed the importance that pre-
cision and clarity have in the delimitation of criminal norms. For instance, in 
Castillo-Petruzzi, and subsequent judgments, the Court said that the principle 
of legality pushes towards a narrow and unambiguous definition of crimes 156 as 
a measure to avoid the abuse of power.  In De La Cruz-Florez v. Peru, the Court 
adds the obligation of any democratic system to ensure that all punishments be 
adopted with careful observance of the rights of the individuals. 157
As it can be seen, there is a legislative gap in the national jurisdiction whi-
ch creates doubt about how any effective redress for victims may be provided 
without affecting the rights of indictees. This situation has made the judiciary, 
when trying to comply with its duty to impart justice, to end up creating a situa-
152 This author explains that “[u]nderinclusion can obviously thwart or at least complicate core 
crimes prosecutions that a State wants to conduct. It can also lead to a violation of the State’s 
international obligations to criminalize the core crimes in its national legislation and to pros-
ecute them. Overinclusion, on the other hand, can cause a State to prosecute acts as core crimes 
that cannot be categorized as such under international law.” warD n. ferDinanDusse, DireCT 
appliCaTion of inTernaTional Criminal law in naTional CourTs 117 – 124, 117 (2006).
153 “Por último, se aclara que existen tipos penales domésticos que pueden compartir algunos 
elementos con las definiciones internacionales de genocidio, crímenes de lesa humanidad o de 
Guerra; sin embargo, ante la ausencia de los elementos que definen estos crímenes, los delitos no 
serán equiparables.” XimenameDellín, Supra note 115, 186 (2009).
154 Hugo Relva, The Implementation of the Rome Statute in Latin American States, 16 Leiden 
J.I.L 331, 333 (2003).
155 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art.9; ICCPR, art. 15. 
156 Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, supra note 91, 121; Cantoral-Benavides v. Peru, supra note 91, 157.
157 Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama, supra note 93.
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tion throughout its interpretative labor of over inclusion of international crimes. 
A good example on this regard relate to certain decisions in respect to the crime 
of qualified conspiracy, which is going to be explained in the following pages. 
One decision which raises some doubts about the judicial understanding of 
what crimes against humanity are, is the judgment held in 2010 about Law 1312 
of 2009.158 This law broadened the cases when the “principio de oportunidad” 
could be applied in criminal proceedings.159 One of the articles of this law stated 
that demobilized members of illegal armed groups could obtain the benefits of 
the aforementioned principle if the following eligibility requirements were met: 
i) the individual had manifested his intention to reintegrate to civilian life, ii) had 
not demobilized under the law of justice and peace, and iii) had no investigations 
opened against him due to the perpetration of crimes before or after his demobi-
lization, except for his membership to the criminal organization.160
The Constitutional Court in a 5 to 4 decision ruled that article 17(2) of the 
aforementioned law was not constitutional and that the approach of the Supreme 
Court about the crime of qualified conspiracy was acceptable.161 The holding was 
that the legality principle was breached by the aforementioned disposition becau-
se the conditions under which the “principio de oportunidad” could be applied 
and the individuals to whom the benefits could be given were not clear.162 Even 
though this statement seems clear, the division between the judges was related to 
their appreciation of whether individuals declared guilty for qualified conspiracy 
could get any of the law’s judicial benefits. Hereisanexcerpt of theruling: 
“[E]n la causal acusada se presenta ambigüedad en cuanto a los 
destinatarios y en relación con las condiciones para su aplicación, 
puesta de manifiesto en los diferentes conceptos expuestos por los 
intervinientes en el proceso de constitucionalidad. Para algunos, 
serían los autores del delito de concierto para delinquir simple […] 
para otros cobijaría únicamente a los autores del concierto para 
delinquir agravado […] y para otros se aplicaría a todos los au-
tores del concierto para delinquir.”163
The dissenting judges said that the crime of qualified conspiracy is not a 
crime against humanity, and that even if it were so, the “principio de oportuni-
dad” would apply to paramilitaries:
158 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [ ConstitutionalCourt] noviembre 23, 1010. Comunicado de Pren-
sa No 59. Sentencia C-936 de 2010, M.P: L. Vargas (Colom.) Whereas 4.
159 “El principio de oportunidad es la facultad constitucional que le permite a la Fiscalía General 
de la Nación, no obstante que existe fundamento para adelantar la persecución penal, suspend-
erla, interrumpirla, o renunciar a ella, por razones de política criminal, según las causales taxa-
tivamente definidas en la ley, con sujeción a la reglamentación expedida por el Fiscal General 
de la Nación y sometido a control de legalidad ante el Juez de Garantías.” L. 1312/09, art.1, 2.
160 Id, art.2 (17), 2.
161 [C.C.] Comunicado de Prensa No 59, supra note 158, Whereas 4.
162 Id.
163 Id. It is important to point out that until the time of writing there was no access to the formal 
judgment but to a communiqué were the main points of the decision were stated. This is the 
reason why a more clear statement of the holding about why the majority said that the afore-
mentioned crime is a crime against humanity was not available.
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“A diferencia de lo acogido por la jurisprudencia de la Corte Su-
prema de Justicia y finalmente acogido en la sentencia de la cual 
nos apartamos, consideramos que el delito de concierto para delin-
quir agravado, objeto de la aplicación del principio de oportuni-
dad para los desmovilizados, no es un delito de lesa humanidad 
[…] además, aun si en gracias de discusión se aceptara que el con-
cierto para delinquir fuera, que no lo es, delito de lesa humanidad, 
eso no implicaría la inconstitucionalidad de la disposición acusa-
da, pues cabe recordar que el artículo 53 del Estatuto de Roma le 
otorga facultades similares al Fiscal para decidir sobre el inicio de 
la investigación.”164
The understanding that the crime of qualified conspiracy is a crime against 
humanity does not have any international support. This situation is an example 
of jurisprudential overinclusion. As the dissenting judges pointed out, the consi-
deration that such crime has the aforesaid qualification was first expressed by the 
Supreme Court in a decision which will be addressed. 
The aforementioned Supreme Court’s holding dates back to 2009 when it sen-
tenced Salvador Arana-Sus, who was a former governor of the department of Sucre.165 
Arana was condemned because of his involvement in a criminal enterprise (paramili-
tarism) which directed the perpetration of the crimes of forced displacement, qualified 
homicide, and qualified conspiracy in the aforementioned department of the country.166 
This tribunal also ordered that investigations were initiated in regard to Arana’s invol-
vement in crimes against humanity committed by the paramilitary group.167
The relevance of this judgment relies on the explanation that it gives about 
why qualified conspiracy is a crime against humanity. This decision changes a 
previous consideration of the same tribunal which stated that the crime of qua-
lified conspiracy is a common crime.168 The Court explains that when a criminal 
enterprise is organized in order to commit crimes such as forced disappearan-
ce, forced displacement, homicide due to political reasons amongst other crimes 
against humanity, this denomination has to be extended to the crime of qualified 
conspiracy.169 The Tribunal cites the Rome Statute in order to explain that not 
only the criminal conducts but the existence of purposes tending to commit cri-
mes against humanity have to be punished in the same way:
164 Id. 
165 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [SupremeCourt], Sala, Pen. Diciembre 3, 2009, M.P: J. 
Socha, Proceso No. 32672 (Colom.). 
166 Id, p. 113.
167 Id, p. 114.
168 The Supreme Court argued in a case against the paramilitary Orlando César Montalvo that 
pardons could only benefit individuals declared guilty of political crimes but not of qualified con-
spiracy, which it characterized as a common crime. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Suprem-
eCourt], Sala, Pen. Julio 11, 2007, M.P: Y. Ramírez & J. Socha, Proceso No. 26945 (Colom.). 
169 “Cuando una empresa criminal se organiza con el propósito de ejecutar delitos como desapar-
ición forzada, desplazamiento forado, torturas, homicidios por razones políticas, etc., punibles 
que se entienden comprendidos dentro de la calificación de delitos de lesa humanidad, dicha 
valoración se debe extender al denominado concierto para delinquir agravado en tanto el acu-
erdo criminal perfeccionó con tales propósitos.” [C.S.J.] Proceso No. 29753, supra note 128, p. 30.
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“Destaca la Sala que el Estatuto de Roma que dio origen a la Corte 
Penal Internacional ha tenido en cuenta no sólo la conducta del 
autor o de los partícipes sino que también ha considerado en espe-
cial la existencia de propósitos dirigidos a cometer delitos de lesa 
humanidad, lo cual significa que también deben ser castigadas en 
igual medida aquellas conductas preparatorias para la comisión 
de delitos que incluyen tanto el cuerdo como el tomar parte en 
una actividad dirigida a ese fin, como ocurre con el concierto para 
delinquir agravado.”170
The Court further states that the crime of qualified conspiracy is a crime against 
humanity.171 This tribunal explains that in order to determine whether individuals res-
ponsible for this crime may be considered authors of crimes against humanity, the follo-
wing requirements have to be met: i) the activities of the organization include some 
crimes against humanity, ii) the membership were voluntary, and iii) most of their 
members had had knowledge about the nature of the criminal organization.172
The former ruling is not sustained in solid legal arguments. There are four 
main reasons to reject such jurisprudential analysis. First, there are no interna-
tional instruments which had included the crime of conspiracy as a crime against 
humanity. Secondly, the Rome Statute does not criminalize the sole membership 
of an individual to a criminal group.173 Thirdly, the Rome Statute only states that 
the contribution of an individual with others to commit or attempt to commit a 
crime is the basis to hold him liable.174 Fourthly, the drafters of the Rome Statute 
decided to drop any conspiracy provision from this instrument.175
 The effect of the Supreme Court’s approach is that when it has acted as 
the judging Court of politicians apparently involved with paramilitary groups, the 
allowance of statutes of limitations are banned. A presumption of culpability starts 
dominating the indictments. It is possible that the members of these criminal or-
ganizations be indicted for the commission of other crimes where they did not have 
any involvement. The only basis to proceed in this way is the suspect membership 
of the individual to the group. One of the judges of the Supreme Court said in rela-
tion to this point that if the organization is financed by drug trafficking, politicians 
linked to paramilitary groups would have to be prosecuted for their participation 
170 Id, p. 30-31.
171 Id, p. 32. [Emphasis in the original text].
172 “Para llegar a considerar a los responsables del concierto para delinquir como autores de 
delitos de lesa humanidad deben estar presentes los siguientes elementos: i) Que las actividades 
públicas de la organización incluyan algunos de los crímenes contra la humanidad; ii) Que sus 
integrantes sean voluntarios; y iii) Que la mayoría de los miembros de la organización debieron 
haber tenido conocimiento o ser conscientes de la naturaleza criminal de la actividad de la orga-
nización.” [C.S.J.] Id, p. 31.
173 Rome Statute art. 25.
174 Rome Statute art. 25(3).
175 Beth Van Schaack& Ronald C. Slye, International Criminal Law and Its Enforcement 
756 – 757 (2007).
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in this crime: “[s]i el aparato de guerra se lucrapor el narcotráfico, obviamente, los 
vinculados a la para política podrían ser juzgados por ese delito”.176
3 Incidence of the Lack of Legislation of Crimes Against Hu-
manity on the Labor of the Judiciary
This chapter will show that the lack of legislation of crimes against hu-
manity has repercussion on the effectiveness of criminal prosecutions. It will be 
evidenced that the existent crimes in the Colombian Criminal Code such as the 
ordinary crime of murder and homicide as a war crime do not have the wides-
pread and systematic elements of murder as a crime against humanity. It will be 
observed that the consequence of this deficiency is that the judiciary has restric-
ted possibilities to determine criminal responsibilities beyond the involvement of 
individuals in single acts of murder. The incidence for victims is the inexistence 
of effective judicial remedies and impunity in the long term.
It will be also observed that besides the fact that crimes against humanity 
are not legislated, the Colombian legal order states that there are statutes of 
limitations in respect to all crimes. It will be seen that while the Constitutional 
tribunal has reinforced the existence of such provisions, contrariwise the Supre-
me Court has said that these measures are not compatible with Colombia’s inter-
national obligations. This situation creates judicial uncertainty about the criteria 
that lower courts should apply. This condition together with the legal uncertainty 
about which crimes fall under the denomination of crimes against humanity has 
repercussion on the way how the judicial branch applies the Supreme tribunal’s 
approach to deal with crimes which are not crimes against humanity. Hence, it 
will be evidenced that the failure of the legislative branch has as consequence 
that the administration of justice becomes imbalanced. 
Thus, this section will explain two main points. First, the prosecutions done 
against militaries involved in the extrajudicial killings known as “falsospositivos” 
[False Positives] based on the ordinary crime of murder and the war crime of 
murder. Secondly, some legal provisions and judicial decisions in respect to the 
existence of statutory limitations in the Colombian legal order will be explained. 
3.1 Extrajudicial Killings: False Positives & the Legislated Crime-
sof Murder 
Legislative distinctions between war crimes, ordinary crimes, and crimes 
against humanity are necessary in the Colombian legal order. As it was mentio-
ned in Chapter II, Colombia has war crimes in its criminal Code. It also has four 
176 Verdadabierta.Com Paramilitares y Conflicto Armado en Colombia, Los Parapolíticos y los 
Crímenes de Lesa Humanidad, Jul. 14, 2010, at <http://www.verdadabierta.com/parapolitica/
antioquia/2564> (Last visited April 3, 2011).
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other core international crimes: genocide,177 forced disappearance,178 forced dis-
placement179 and torture.180 However, crimes against humanity are not typified. 
This gap and also the fact that ordinary crimes and war crimes, which have been 
employed to indict people involved in the commission of crimes against humani-
ty, do not have the elements of latter, is that prosecutions are not able to reach a 
successful outcome. This situation is called by Ferdinandusse, as cited in Chapter 
II, underinclusion of international norms. 
This author explains in regard to the underinclusion problem that Sta-
tes tend to miscalculate the way how their criminal statutes cover internatio-
nal crimes.181 He cites the German case described by Bremer in order to show 
that “the reliance of Germany on ordinary crimes prior to the adoption of the 
2003 Code on International Crimes failed to ensure the prosecution of all war 
crimes.”182EzequielMalarino also explains some deficiencies in the same regard 
in Argentina.183 He states that prosecutions need to be done based on ordinary 
crimes in order to comply with the principle of nullum crime, nullapoena sine 
legepraevia.184 Following this reasoning, he argues in respect to the crime of ge-
nocide that its absence in the Argentinian Criminal Code has to be supplied by 
making use of ordinary crimes.185 The problem which he finds on this point is 
that the subjective element of genocide, which according to article 6 of the Rome 
Statute is the intention to destroy racial, ethnic, national or religious groups, is 
not included in any of the ordinary crimes.186
The importance to legislate crimes in accordance to international standar-
ds is found in one holding of the Constitutional Court of Colombia. Its judgment 
C-171 of 2001 contains some considerations on this matter.187 It mentions the 
relevance of doing the legislative adequacy of international crimes in accordance 
to the wording of international dispositions.188 This specific holding declares that 
the crime of genocide, which was legislated in 2000, was contrary to the Conven-
tion on Genocide that the Colombian State ratified in 1959.189 The Court states 
that the definition of the crime in the Criminal Code restricted the protection of 
the rights to life, personal integrity, and freedom.190 The sphere of protection of 
the crime was limited to people who had not been involved in illegal acts:191
177 [C.Pen.] art 101 (Col.).
178 Id, art 165.
179 Id, art 180.
180 Id, art 178.
181 Ward N. Ferdinandusse, supra note 152, 118.
182 Ward N. Ferdinandusse, supra note 152, 118.
183 Ezequiel Malarino, Argentina, in Persecución Penal Nacional de Crímenes Internacionales 




187 [C.C.] febrero 14, 2001. Sentencia C-171 de 2001, M.P: F. Morón (Colom.) 
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“[L]ejos de adoptar las medidas de adecuación legislativas conso-
nantes con las obligaciones internacionales que el Estado Colom-
biano contrajo, en particular, al suscribir la Convención de las Na-
ciones Unidas para la Prevención y Sanción del Delito de Genocidio 
[…] desvirtuó el propósito que con su consagración normativa se 
perseguía, pues se restringió la protección de los derechos a la vida, 
a la integridad personal y a la libertad de las personas, al concederla 
únicamente en tanto y siempre y cuando la conducta atentatoria 
recaiga sobre un miembro de un grupo nacional, étnico, racial, reli-
gioso o político “que actúe dentro del margen de la Ley”.192
The same reasoning can be applied to crimes against humanity. In order 
to better understand the priority which should be given to this point, the crime 
of murder as a war crime, as an ordinary crime, and as a crime against humanity 
will be considered. This chapter will focus on this specific type due to the fact that 
prosecutions in regard to the false positives have been done based on the first two 
denominations. As it was mentioned, the Colombian Criminal Code has the crime 
of homicide legislated under two different titles: war crimes and ordinary crimes. 
Under the first denomination, the crime is known as homicide of a protected per-
son.193 The other type is known just as homicide.194
The spheres of applicability of the two aforementioned crimes differ now that 
each one of them has different constitutive elements. Moreover, as it was stated in 
the previous chapter, none of them have the elements of the crime of murder as a 
crime against humanity. The war crime of murder is defined in the Colombian law 
under the context of an armed conflict: “[e]l que, con ocasión y en desarrollo del con-
flictoarmado […].”195 The common crime of murder is described just as the action of 
killing someone: “[e]l quematareaotro […].”196 As XimenaMedellín recalls, there are 
some basic elements to each one of the international crimes.197 In regard to genoci-
de, she says that it has -as it was also explained in the aforementioned judgment of 
the Constitutional Court C-171 of 2001- the genocidal intention.198 Crimes against 
humanity have the widespread or systematic nature against civilian populations.199 
War crimes have the link with an armed conflict.200 Cassesse says that the crime of 
murder as a crime against humanity requires not only the objective element of cau-
sing the dead to someone, but “a broader objective context” which is the widespread 
or systematic attack on the civilian population in time of either war or peace, and a 
mental element which is the “awareness of the existence of such broader context.”201 
Neither the widespread nor the systematic nature of crimes against humanity is con-
192 Id. [Emphasis added].
193 [C.Pen.] art. 135 (Col.).
194 Id, art. 104.
195 Id, art. 135.
196 Id, art. 104.




201 Antonio Cassesse, supra note 126, 54.
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tained in the aforementioned crimes of murder in the Colombian law. The mental 
element of the offense is not evidenced either. 
It is true that the judiciary cannot abstain from seeking justice by pro-
secuting the perpetrators of crimes based on the deficiencies of the legal order. 
However, a complete administration of justice would be in compliance with inter-
national criteria. The following paragraphs will show how legislative deficiencies 
in the determination of crimes have repercussions on the effectiveness of the 
prosecutions done until now in regard to the false positives.
The false positives are extrajudicial killings committed by members of the ar-
med forces against civilians.202 They presented the dead bodies of civilians as if they 
were of guerrilla members who died in combat.203 The technique used to commit 
these crimes consisted on three stages. First, a recruiter, who was often a civilian, 
recruited other civilians under tricks such as the offering of an employment. Se-
condly, the recruiters deprived them of physical liberty for a short period of time. 
Lastly, militaries arrived to the place where the civilians were and killed them.204
The extrajudicial killings phenomenon is not new;205 however, since 2002 it 
significantly increased.206 Philip Alston, who is a former UN Special Rapporteur 
on extrajudicial executions, went on a mission to Colombia in June of 2009 and 
explained that usually the killers were rewarded “for the results they have achie-
ved in the fight against the guerrillas.”207 This situation might have had relation 
with the enactment of a secret resolution by the Ministry of Defense in 2005, whi-
ch stated compensations for detention or murder in combat of members of illegal 
armed groups.208 As it was mentioned, the killings had been primarily of civilians. 
202 Hernando Salazar, Colombia: ejecuciones “muy alarmantes”, BBC Mundo, Colombia, Nov. 1, 
2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_7704000/7704520.stm>.
203 Id.
204 This information was provided in a meeting, by the mothers of some of the false positives who 
resided in Soacha, which is a municipality close to Bogota-Colombia; also Philip Alston explains 
that “[t]he victim is lured under false pretenses by a “recruiter” to a remote location. There, the 
individual is killed soon after arrival by members of the military. The scene is then manipulated 
to make it appear as if the individual was legitimately killed in combat. The victim is commonly 
photographed wearing a guerrilla uniform, and holding a gun or grenade.” Press Release, State-
ment by Professor Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, Mission to 
Colombia 8-18 June 2009, [Press Release Philip Alston] at <http://www.hchr.org.co/documen-
toseinformes/documentos/relatoresespeciales/2009/Colombia%20Press%20statement%20EN.
pdf> (Last visited April 10, 2011).
205 See Michael Evans, Body Count Mentalities, Colombia’s “False Positives” Scandal, Declas-
sified, National Security Archive – George Washington University (Jan.7, 2009), <http://www.
gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB266/index.htm> (Last visited April 10, 2011).
206 The newspaper El Espectador reported in 2010 that the organization “Coordinación Colom-
bia-Europa” revealed that there have been 3,796 registered extrajudicial executions since 1994 
and that 3,084 of them were perpetrated since 2002. El Espectador, Denuncian más de 3 mil eje-
cuciones extrajudiciales entre 2002 y 2009, May. 24, 2009, http://www.elespectador.com/ejecucio-
nes-extrajudiciales/articulo-204807-colombia-hubo-mas-de-3-mil-ejecuciones-extrajudiciales-e 
(LastvisitedApril 10, 2011).
207 Press Release Philip Alston, supra note 204.
208 “ASUNTO: Política ministerial que desarrolla criterios para el pago de recompensas por la 
captura o abatimiento en combate de cabecillas de las organizaciones armadas al margen de la 
ley, material de guerra […]” [Emphasis Added] Article 3 of this resolution established payments 
between ~ US$1,907.5 and ~US$2,500,000, which were dependent of the level within the illegal 
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Alston pointed out that he could not “rule out the possibility that some of the fal-
sospositivos were, in fact, guerrillas, but apart from sweeping allegations, I have 
been provided with no sustained evidence to that effect by the Government.”209
Alston also said that while he did not find that the killings were the respon-
se of a Governmental plan, he did observe that the executions were committed 
in a systematic fashion.210 However, the systematic character of the extrajudicial 
killings and its possible primary causes has not been object of study in the pro-
secutions which have been conducted. Instead, the information available about 
them shows that the investigations have not gone beyond the determination of 
responsibilities of the direct perpetrators and officials in a supervisorial position 
in respect to the first ones.211
The aforesaid limitations may be a consequence of the fact that the prose-
cutions have been done based on either the common crime of murder or the war 
crime of homicide of a protected person.212 These offences do not have the wides-
pread and systematic elements of that the crimes against humanity have. Even 
if authorities considered the context of the killings, their number since 2002,213 
and the fact that there are 1,487 cases and 791 individuals under investigation,214 
there is no legal possibility to indict someone beyond the framework of the abo-
vementioned crimes. The obstacle that this situation creates is that the judicial 
disclosure of the context of crimes against humanity is not possible.215
Besides the general deficiencies under the legislated crimes of murder, the 
fact that a country has an ongoing war cannot lead to the presumption that all 
crimes committed by the parties in the conflict are war crimes. The prosecutions 
of falses positives under the war crime of murder may also fail due to this reason. 
This gap was explained by the representatives of the victims in the Supreme 
Court’s judgment analyzed in Chapter II against Gian Carlo Gutiérrez, who was 
a member of the Calima Block of the AUC.216 The lawyers said that the charge for 
war crimes does not open any judicial path to either recognize the influence of the 
armed group of the members captured or killed.” Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Secreto, Di-
rectiva Ministerial Permanente No. 29/2005, 17 Nov. 2005. Theresolutionwasdistributedto 16 
differentstate agencies: Comando General FFMM, Comando Fuerza Aérea, Comando Armada 
Nacional, Policía Nacional, Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad, Cuerpo Administrativo 
de Investigación, Dirección Inteligencia Ejército Nacional, Dirección Inteligencia DAS, and others.
209 Press Release Philip Alston, supra note 204.
210 “I have found no evidence to suggest that these killings were carried out as a matter of of-
ficial Government policy, or that they were directed by, or carried out with the knowledge of, 
the President or successive Defence Ministers […] The sheer number of cases, their geographic 
spread, and the diversity of military units implicated, indicate that these killings were carried 
out in a more or less systematic fashion by significant elements within the military.” Id.
211 See news on falsospositivos in Semana.com, at <http://www.semana.com/wf_Buscador.
aspx?Buscar=falsos%20posittivos >(Last visited April 11, 2011); also in El Espectador, at 
<http://www.elespectador.com/search/apachesolr_search/falsos%20positivos> (Last visited 
April 11, 2011).
212 Id.
213 See supra note 81.
214 Semana.com, Lentos positivos, Jan. 29, 2011, <http://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/len-
tos-positivos/150992.aspx> (Last visited April 11, 2011).
215 Ward N. Ferdinandusse, supra note 152, 173 – 220, 206.
216 [C.S.J] Proceso No. 32022, supra note 127.
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indictee on the population under the influence of his paramilitary block nor the 
dismantling of predetermined plans behind the criminal acts committed by the 
block. The same point of Ferdinandusse in regard to the deficiencies of prosecu-
ting core international crimes based on ordinary offenses can be used in regard to 
the use of the war crime of murder. He says that: “[to] prosecute a core crime as 
an ordinary crime is quite unsatisfactory. It ignores important aspects of the pro-
secuted act, like its broader context and the particular intent of the perpetrator 
[…] Ordinary offenses do simply not express the criminality of the conduct to be 
prosecuted in an adequate manner.”217
3.2 Statutory Limitations and Crimes Against Humanity
Now this chapter turns to explain that the lack of legislation of crimes against 
humanity reinforced by the fact that the legislature established that all crimes are 
prescriptible leads to an unfair administration of justice. First, it will be seen that 
while the Constitutional Court has denied that the Rome Statute’s provision about 
the inexistence of statute of limitations for crimes against humanity is accepta-
ble in the Colombian legal system, the Supreme Court has supported the opposite 
point of view and the result is the lack of judicial certainty. Secondly, the application 
of the contradictory rulings of both Courts in addition to the legal gap about what 
crimes against humanity are, has led to i) the application of statutes of limitations 
to crimes which could be considered to be crimes against humanity, and ii) the de-
nial of prescription terms to crimes which are not crimes against humanity. 
Statutory limitations are allowed in the internal juridical order. Article 82 of 
the Criminal Code establishes the existence of statutory limitations of the criminal 
action.218 This same article further clarifies that the minimum and maximum years of 
statutes of limitations are 5 and 20.219 The only cases when the maximum limit increa-
ses is in relation to the crimes of genocide, forced disappearance, forced displacement, 
torture, and homicides of members of a legally recognized trade union organization, 
human rights defenders, and journalists.220 In the aforesaid cases the time is 30 ye-
ars.221 Article 84 goes further by explaining when statutory limitations’ time starts run-
ning. Thus, in criminal actions of immediate execution the time period starts counting 
as soon as the offense is committed.222 In regard to conducts of permanent execution, 
the period of time starts running since the last criminal act is perpetrated.223
The Constitutional Court has analyzed the nature and applicability of sta-
tutory limitations. Three of its holdings will be briefly mentioned. The first one is 
217 Ward N. Ferdinandusse, supra note 152, 173 – 220, 206.
218 [C.Pen.] art 82 (Col.).
219 [C.Pen.] art 83, ¶1 (Col.).
220 [C.Pen.] art 83, ¶2 (Col.).
221 [C.Pen.] art 83, ¶2 (Col.).
222 “En las conductas punibles de ejecución instantánea el término de prescripción de la acción 
comenzará a correr desde el día de su consumación.” [C.Pen.] art 84, 1 (Col.).
223 “En las conductas punibles de ejecución permanente o en las que solo alcancen el grado de 
tentativa, el término comenzará a correr desde la perpetración del último acto.” [C.Pen.] art 84, 
2 (Col.).
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judgment C-578 of 2002, which contains the analysis of the Rome Statute after it 
was approved by Law 742 of 2002.224 The second judgment is C-580 of 2002, which 
relates to the study of the treaty on enforced disappearance after it was ratified 
by Colombia.225 The last one is judgment C-801 of 2009, which studies the rules of 
procedure and elements of the crimes226 contained in the Rome Statute.227
 The Constitutional Court states in its judgment C-578 of 2002 that inter-
national criminal regulations such as the ones of the Rome Statute have to be 
interpreted in relation to the provisions of the national order.228 It further esta-
blishes that there is some imprecision in the description of certain crimes in the 
Rome Statute and that this situation suggests that its standards of the principle 
of legality are less strict than in the national legal system.229 This tribunal then 
mentions that even though this lower level of precision is admissible in interna-
tional law, the national constitution demands more accuracy.230 After doing the 
former clarifications, the Court enters into the study of the general principles 
of international law described in the Statute and compares them to the internal 
legal order. Statute of limitations is one of the points under examination.
The constitutional tribunal ignores in its assessment on statutory limita-
tions the Barrios Altos judgment, which was decided by the Inter American Court 
on Human Rights the year prior to the ratification of the Rome Statute, about the 
non-acceptance of this criminal benefit when dealing with crimes against huma-
nity.231 The Court says that even though the Rome Statute recognizes the impres-
criptibility of crimes, Colombia has to comply with its international obligations 
under the ICCPR and ACHR.232 Thus, it expresses that the permission of statutory 
limitations violates article 2(1) of the ICCPR and 24 of the ACHR.233 The Court 
explains that the State is under the duty to do investigations without delay.234 It 
further says that society cannot wait for a long period of time the determination of 
those who are guilty or not guilty.235 The constitutional tribunal ends up explaining 
that the non-existence of statutory limitations in the ICC’s Statute is accepted just 
in cases handled by the ICC. Theinclusion of imprescriptibilityprovisionsdoesno-
thaveanyincidence in theColombian legal system: “[s]e trata de un tratamiento dis-
tinto respecto de una categoría constitucional […] que opera exclusivamente dentro 
del ámbito regulado por dicho Estatuto.”236The Constitutional Court finishes its 
224 [C.C.] julio 30, 2002. Sentencia C-578 de 2002, M.P: M. Cepeda (Colom.).
225 [C.C.] julio 31, 2002. Sentencia C-580 de 2002, M.P: R. Escobar (Colom.).
226 See UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000), International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes. 
227 [C.C.] noviembre 10, 2009. Sentencia C-801 de 2009, M.P: G. Mendoza (Colom.).
228 [C.C.] Sentencia C-578 de 2002, supra note 224, Whereas 4.1.4.2.
229 Id, Whereas 4.1.4.2.
230 Id, Whereas 4.1.4.2.
231 Barrios Altos v. Peru, supra note 63, 41.
232 [C.C.] Sentencia C-578 de 2002, supra note 224, Whereas 4.5.2.3.
233 Id.
234 [E]l principio de celeridad debe caracterizar los procesos penales. Ni el sindicado tiene el de-
ber constitucional de esperar indefinidamente que el Estado califique el sumario o profiera una 
sentencia condenatoria, ni la sociedad puede esperar por siempre el señalamiento de los autores 
o de los inocentes de los delitos que crean zozobra en la comunidad.” [C.C.] Id. 
235 Id.
236 Id.
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analysis clarifying that the Rome Statutes dispositions do not replace or modify 
national laws.237 Therefore, the individual who commits a crime in the country has 
to be prosecuted based on Colombian law.238
The only exception to the prescription rule of criminal actions in the Colom-
bian legal order is found in the decision C-580 of 2002.239 The Court says that limi-
tations to begin any criminal actions have to be examined according to two main 
points: i) the gravity of the crime and ii) the necessity to stop impunity when the 
gathering of proofs or prosecutions of criminals are difficult.240 This tribunal justifies 
the non-existence of statutes of limitations to begin any action against the crime of 
forced disappearance due to four main reasons. First, it does not affect the freedom 
of the individual nor puts any extra weight against him.241 Secondly, it allows victi-
ms and society to get to know the truth and achieve justice.242 Thirdly, victims may 
exercise their rights to reparation.243 Lastly, since getting the necessary evidence in 
a limited time is difficult, the imprescriptibility of the criminal action helps to avoid 
this barrier.244 The Court concludes that while the criminal action is not restricted by 
the existence of statutory limitations, once the indictee is subject to criminal prose-
cution, the prescription terms of the criminal action start running.245
The former reasoning creates some doubts about why the criteria to deny 
statutory limitations for the crime of forced disappearance were not considered 
in the judgment where the Rome Statute was analyzed. There is no basis to think 
that victims and society want truth and justice to come out in regard to all crimes 
against humanity in a lower degree compared to the crime of forced disappearan-
ce. It will be seen that the Court has not changed its appreciation on statutory li-
mitations for crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC. In fact, the same reasoning 
237 Id, Whereas 4.16.
238 “Del análisis material anterior se aprecia que las normas del Estatuto surten efectos dentro 
del ámbito de la competencia de la Corte Penal Internacional. Las disposiciones en él conteni-
das no reemplazan ni modifican las leyes nacionales de tal manera que a quien delinca en el 
territorio nacional se le aplicará el ordenamiento jurídico interno y las autoridades judiciales 
competentes al efecto son las que integran la administración de justicia colombiana.” [C.C.] Id.
239 [C.C.] Sentencia C-580 de 2002, supra note 225.
240 “[E]llo no significa que el único criterio razonable para fijar el término de prescripción de la 
acción penal sea la gravedad de la conducta, pues dentro del diseño de la política criminal del 
Estado el legislador puede determinar el término de prescripción a partir de otros criterios val-
orativos […] [e]ntre ellos, pueden considerarse la necesidad de erradicar la impunidad frente a 
delitos en los cuales resulta especialmente difícil recopilar pruebas o juzgar efectivamente a los 
responsable.”  [C.C.] Id, Whereas 3.2 (article 7)
241 “[L]a imprescriptibilidad de una acción penal no tendría como consecuencia automática prolon-
gar en el tiempo la ejecución de una actividad material concreta del Estado tendiente a privar de la 
libertad individual a un sujeto determinado, ni a agravar la carga que tiene que soportar.” [C.C.] Id.
242 “[P]or el interés de erradicar la impunidad, para lo cual es necesario que la sociedad y los 
afectados conozcan la verdad, que se atribuyan las responsabilidades […] y en general que se 
garantice el derecho de las víctimas a la justicia.” [C.C.] Id.
243 “[P]or el derecho de las víctimas a recibir una reparación por los daños.” [C.C.] Id.
244 “[D]ebido a la dificultad que suponen las recopilación de las pruebas necesarias y el juzga-
miento efectivo quienes habitualmente incurren en tales conductas.” [C.C.] Id.
245 “[L]a imprescriptibilidad de la acción penal resulta conforme a la Carta Política, siempre y 
cuando no se haya vinculado a la persona al proceso a través de indagatoria. Cuando el acusado 
ya ha sido vinculado, empezarán a correr los términos de prescripción de la acción penal, si el 
delito está consumado.” [C.C.] Id.
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of judgment C-578 of 2002 is found in the holding where this tribunal analyzes 
the rules of procedure and elements of the crimes of the Rome Statute.
Indeed, the Constitutional Court reiterates in its judgment C-801 of 2009246 
what it had stated in the decision of 2002 about the fact that differentiated cri-
minal treatments are allowed just in cases where the ICC exercises its jurisdic-
tion.247 The Court repeats the holding of 2002 about the permission of statute of 
limitations in the Colombian criminal order.248 It does not take into consideration 
the fact that the Inter-American Court stated in the Almonacid case in 2006, 
three years before the Constitutional tribunal had rendered the decision under 
analysis, that the non-applicability of these types of measures for crimes against 
humanity is a jus cogens norm.249
The prior holdings of the Constitutional Court demonstrate that this insti-
tution has reinforced the legislature’s failure to restrict the applicability of statu-
tory limitations. This situation is an example of the State’s violation of its inter-
national obligation to establish the imprescriptibility of crimes against humanity. 
They infringe the Inter-American approach to this matter, the Rome Statute’s in-
clusion of the imprescriptibility of the crimes that it typifies and also contradicts 
the opinion jurison this respect. They challenge the Barrios Altos and Almonacid 
decisions by leaving aside the fact that the non-applicability of statutory limita-
tions to crimes against humanity is, according to the second aforesaid judgment, 
a jus cogens norm. This consideration has been reiterated by the scholars mentio-
ned in chapter I such as Kok, Cassesse, Van Den Wynegaert, and Dugard. Their 
insight supports the view that there are customary rules and jus cogens norms 
which reject the existence of statutory limitations for crimes against humanity. 
The next is a Supreme Court’s decision examined in chapter II, from Sep-
tember 21st of 2009.250 In this holding the Supreme tribunal paraphrased the 
Constitutional Court’s judgment C-580 of 2002 to argue that the understanding 
of statutes of limitations in regard to force disappearance is applicable to crimes 
against humanity.251 This tribunal did not mention the Constitutional Court’s 
aforesaid decisions of 2002 and 2009 about the Rome Statute and elements of the 
crimes in the ICCs statute. Instead, the Supreme Court arrived to two main con-
clusions. First, investigation of crimes against humanity does not have statutory 
limitations.252 Secondly, imprescriptibility is not legitimate when someone has 
already been indicted.253A general idea of whatthe Courtstatedis:
Es factible, entonces, que un delito de lesa humanidad reporte 
como tal la condición de imprescriptibilidad en su investigación, 
pero acerca de personas determinadas –individualizadas y for-
malmente vinculadas- exija el cumplimiento de los términos de in-
246 [C.C.] Sentencia C-801 de 2009, supra note 227.
247 Id, Whereas 2.2.14.
248 Id, Whereas 5.1.3.
249 See Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, supra note 70, ¶153.
250 [C.S.J] Proceso No 32022, supra note 127.
251 Id, p. 217.
252 Id, p. 216.
253 Id, p. 216.
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vestigación y juzgamiento[…] en los casos de delitos permanentes 
–como la desaparición forzada-, ese término prescriptivo no corre 
hasta que se sepa del destino del desaparecido[…] Desde luego, 
reitera la corte que esos fundamentos perfectamente son válidos 
para atender en el caso concreto la evaluación de cualquier delito 
de lesa humanidad y los efectos que sobre el mismo pueda traer la 
prescripción de la acción penal y la pena.254
This ruling was well received by NGOs and some public characters.255 Ho-
wever, it poses some questions about the way how justice may be administered 
by lower courts if the judgment of two of the highest Courts in the country, the 
Supreme and the Constitutional Courts, are contradictory on this matter. There 
are two main difficulties. On the one hand, the prosecution of crimes which could 
be categorized as being crimes against humanity has been hampered by the use 
of statute of limitations based on legal provisions and the Constitutional Courts 
decisions which have reinforced the first ones. On the other hand, crimes which 
even though might have a big impact in society but their gravity do not amount 
to the one of crimes against humanity, have been prosecuted without respect to 
these type of limitation based upon the Supreme Court’s ruling.
An example to the first difficulty is the Rochela Massacre, which occurred 
in January 1989.256 Many criminal tribunals have analyzed the case throughout 
the years, and this discontinuity has delayed the possibility to achieve justice.257 
The Grupo de MemoriaHistórica [Historical Memory Group] explains that inves-
tigations have been opened against some of the people involved in the crime after 
the prescription term had been reached, based on international jurisprudence.258 
Nevertheless, prior to that initiative, statutes of limitation had always been a risk 
to the continuity of the process.259 In fact, one district court declared in 2008 that 
statutes of limitation had entered into force after so many years of the commission 
of the massacre had passed.260 It said that the direct participation of the indictees in 
254 Id, p. 216.
255 Michael Reed Hurtado, who is Chief Director of the ICTJ-Colombia, said that the judgments 
of the Supreme Court are valuable and coherent with international human rights standards: 
“Los últimosfallos de la Corte Suprema […] son valiosos y coherentes. No sólo se ajustan a los 
estándares del derecho internacional, sino que abren la puerta para que satisfaga un clamor 
politico y social nacional e internacional que existe desde hace décadas.” ICTJ, Procesosbajo-
Justicia y Paz puedenserjuzgadospordelitos de lesahumanidad, Oct. 5, 2009, at <http://www.
ictj.org/es/news/coverage/article/3121.html> (Last visited April 9, 2011); also León Valencia, 
who is Director of the Nuevo Arco Iris corporation, said that one of the most relevant conse-
quences of the ruling of the Supreme Court is that crimes against humanity are imprescriptible. 
Verdadabierta.Coom Paramilitares y Conflicto Armado en Colombia, Los Parapolíticos y los 
Crímenes de Lesa Humanidad, Jul. 14, 2010, at <http://www.verdadabierta.com/parapolitica/
antioquia/2564> (Last visited April 9, 2011).
256 CNRR, Informe del Grupo de la Memoria Histórica de la Comisión Nacional de Reparación y 
Reconciliación, La Rochela: Memorias de un Crimen contra la Justicia, 2010.
257 Semana.com, La Rochela: Parábola de la Injusticia, September 18, 2010, <http://www.se-
mana.com/nacion/rochela-parabola-injusticia/144762-3.aspx> (Lastvisited 25 April 2011).
258 CNRR, Informe del Grupo de la Memoria Histórica de la Comisión Nacional de Reparación y 
Reconciliación, La Rochela: Memorias de un Crimen contra la Justicia, 2010, p. 86.
259 Id, p. 136.
260 Id, p. 138.
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the massacre had not been proven and that since the only charge against them was 
the crime of qualified conspiracy, the criminal action had prescribed.261
An example of the second difficulty is the use of international standards 
to avoid the prescription term of the criminal action against crimes such as drug 
trafficking and qualified conspiracy.262 Michael Reed Hurtado, who is the director 
of the ICTJ in Colombia, denounced the situation in regard to drug trafficking 
prosecutions.263 He said that the General Attorney’s Office should not qualify 
drug trafficking offenses as crimes against humanity in order to begin prosecu-
tions after the criminal actions had expired.264 The same has happened in relation 
to prosecutions against individuals indicted for qualified conspiracy. Chapter II 
mentioned that the Supreme and Constitutional Courts declared that this crime 
is a crime against humanity. This chapter showed the Supreme Court’s ruling 
about that statutory limitations are not applicable to crimes against humanity. 
The consequence of these two premises is that prosecutions based on the eviden-
ce that someone could have had relation with a criminal organization might be 
opened at any moment. The indicia of the involvement of the individual in what 
international law has defined as crimes against humanity would not be necessary.
Legislative determinations should not be based on judicial assumptions but 
explicit legal provisions. A fair administration of justice should be based upon 
the protection of human rights of all parties involved in a process. It means that 
appropriate legislation has to be adopted in compliance with the State’s inter-
national duties to guarantee the effective access of victims to judicial remedies 
and compliance with the principle of legality. The Colombian case shows that the 
enactment of national rules is a necessity. This type of measure becomes a prio-
rity due to, as Cecilia Medina Quiroga explains, the emergence of problems when 
the interpretation of national and international norms by the judicial branch 
puts in risk the access to adequate and efficient legal remedies.265
The prior examples demonstrate that national legal provisions about the 
offenses which could be qualified as crimes against humanity are a necessity. This 
would be the first step to then clearly specify the cases when the imprescriptibi-
lity of the criminal action is permitted. The codification of precise crimes would 
be the basis for effective prosecutions. The Trujillo-Oroza case, which was men-
tioned in chapter I, illustrates this point.266 The Inter-American Court explains 
in the aforementioned judgment that the lack of legislation of the crime of forced 
disappearance becomes an obstacle to do effective investigations.267 The same ha-
ppens in Colombia in regard to crimes against humanity. By taking the necessary 
legislative measures, an effective administration to justice in favor of victims and 
261 Id.
262 Michael Reed Hurtado, Sobre los delitos de lesa humanidad, International Center forTran-
sitionalJustice, January 7, 2010, at <http://www.ictj.org/en/news/coverage/article/3362.html> 
(Last visited 25 April 2011).
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Cecilia Medina Quiroga, supra note 9, 246-247.
266 Trujillo-Oroza v. Bolivia, supra note 66, 96 - 98.
267 Trujillo-Oroza v. Bolivia, supra note 66, 96 - 98.
Espaço Jurídico                                                                  Joaçaba, v. 12, n. 1, p. 25-64, jan./jun. 2011
The Obligation to Legislate ...
63
indictees would be guaranteed. This would allow victims to get access to effec-
tive judicial remedies. It would also allow indictees not to be subject of judicial 
extralimitations. The existence of appropriate norms would be the basis for an 
appropriate State conduct,268 which would lead to the full realization of the rights 
embodied in the ICCPR and the ACHR. 
CONCLUSION
Colombia has to take the necessary legislative measures in order to comply 
with the obligations that it has acquired under the ICCPR and the ACHR, and 
also with its duty to make its juridical apparatus work with efficiency, as the com-
plementarity principle of the Rome Statute requires. The practical implications 
of the absence of crimes against humanity in the Criminal Code already described 
and which are going to be briefly summarized, reinforce the need to adapt its le-
gislation to international standards.
The absence of crimes against humanity in the Colombian legislation has 
raised difficulties for the administration of justice. This deficiency has had nega-
tive impact on the way how the highest Courts in the country have addressed the 
definition of these crimes, and whether juridical measures such as statutory limi-
tations are applicable, or not. The Constitutional Court has analyzed the defini-
tion of crimes against humanity and how their punishment should be. However, 
it has not succeeded in establishing clear distinctions between the spheres of pro-
tection of these types of offenses, ordinary crimes, and war crimes. The holdings 
of the Constitutional tribunal have been taken into consideration by the Supreme 
Court in some of its decisions on criminal matters. The result is that the practical 
application of the constitutional analyses on criminal cases has repercussion on 
the balance that should be maintained for all parties in a judicial process. 
The lack of legislation on crimes against humanity has created some obsta-
cles to do efficient prosecutions. On the one hand, this legislative gap has left the 
judicial branch with the responsibility of making decisions that integrate inter-
national instruments and national legislation. The problem is that by doing this 
activity it has sometimes trespassed the boundaries established by international 
law about the qualification of crimes as crimes against humanity. This is a com-
plicated task as the Colombian criminal legal system is built upon the principle of 
nullumpoena sine lege, nullumcrimen sine lege. The only tools that the judiciary 
has, for instance, to prosecute an individual for the commission of murder as a 
crime against humanity are the ordinary crime of murder and the war crime of 
homicide. The difficulty that arises is that the effectiveness of their applicability 
is not clear when considerations of the contextual elements of the crimes against 
humanity are not present in the aforementioned ones. 
 Another obstacle is related to the fact that statutory limitations are re-
gulated in the Criminal Code. However, the two highest Courts in the State, the 
Supreme and the Constitutional Courts, have contradictory case law on when 
268 Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, supra note 33, 167; Godinez-Cruz v. Honduras, supra note 33, 176.
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statutory limitations are applicable. While the Constitutional Court has reinfor-
ced the national legal rules throughout its jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has 
taken the opposite point of view in relation to international crimes. The lack of 
legislation and the differing judicial interpretations have hampered the possibi-
lity to do effective prosecutions. This means that some criminal processes have 
not been carried out due to the application of these kinds of criminal measures, 
affecting the rights of victims. Other processes have instead continued due to 
their misapplication in regard to crimes which do not amount to crimes against 
humanity, affecting the rights of defendants. 
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